



WORKSHOP ON PRINCIPLES AND APPROACHES FOR CBNRM IN MALAWI

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Community
Partnerships for
Sustainable
Resource
Management in
Malawi

Workshop on principles and approaches for CBNRM in Malawi: An assessment of needs for effective implementation of CBNRM

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction	1
1.1. Purpose of workshop	1
1.2. Approach	1
1.3. Participants	2
2. Proceedings of the workshop	2
2.1. Opening	2
2.2. Technical and informational papers	2
2.3. Thematic discussions	3
2.4. Small group work	4
3. Summary and recommendations	4
3.1. Guiding principles	4
3.2. Incentives for encouraging CBNRM	5
3.3. Institutional arrangements for improved coordination	6
4. Conclusion	7

Annexes

Annex 1: List of workshop participants	9
Annex 2: Institutional Arrangements for Improved Management of Natural Resources by Local Communities in Malawi: An Overview with Recommendations for More Effective Coordination of Programmes and Activities	11
Annex 3: Community-based Natural Resources Management in Forestry Sector	20
Annex 4: Community-based Natural Resources Management: A Case of Participatory Fisheries Management in the Lakes Malombe, Chilwa, Chiuta and Upper Shire Valley	27
Annex 5: Wildlife Sector Community-based Natural Resources Experiences	47
Annex 6: Suggested Guidelines for Standardising Incentives for Encouraging CBNRM and Ensuring Sustainable Financing Mechanisms for CBNRM Initiatives	67
Annex 7: An Overview of Community-based Natural Resource Management in Africa	75
Annex 8: Institutional Arrangements for Improved Management of Natural Resources by Local Communities in Malawi: Recommendations on Modalities for Community-based Natural Resources Management in Malawi	95

ACRONYMS

ADMADE	Administrative Management Design
ARET	Agricultural Research Extension Trust
BVC	Beach Village Committee
BZDP	Border Zone Development Project
CABUNGO	Capacity Building Unit for Non-Governmental Organisations
CAMPFIRE	Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
CBNRM	Community-based Natural Resource Management
CBO	Community-based Organization
CITES	Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
CLU	Community Liaison Unit
CM	Collaborative Management
COBRA	Conservation of Biodiverse Resource Areas
COMPASS	Community Partnerships for Sustainable Resource Management
CTA	Chief Technical Advisor
CURE	Coordination Unit for Rehabilitation of the Environment
DAI	Development Alternatives, Incorporated
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DDC	District Development Committee
DEA	Director of Environmental Affairs
DfID	Department for International Development (formerly ODA)
DNPW	Department of National Parks and Wildlife
DWNP	Department of Wildlife and National Parks
EAD	Environmental Affairs Department
EDO	Environmental District Officer
EU	The European Union
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
FD	Fisheries Department
GELOSE	Gestion locale sécurisé
GMA	Game Management Area
ICDP	Integrated Conservation and Development Project
IDA	International Development Authority
IGA	Income Generating Activities
IUCN/ROSA	The World Conservation Union - Regional Office for Southern Africa
KWS	Kenya Wildlife Service
LAC	Local Advisory Committee
LIFE	Living in a Finite Environment
LIRDP	Luangwa Integrated Rural Development Project
MAGFAD	Malawi-German Fisheries & Aquaculture Development Project
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEET	Malawi Environmental Endowment Trust
MGBDP	Malawi-German Bee Keeping Development Project
MGDP	Malawi-German Development Programme
MK	Malawi Kwacha
NAFCOM	National Forum for Collaborative Management
NCE	National Council on the Environment
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development

NPWS	National Parks and Wildlife Service
NRC	Natural Resource Committee
NRM	Natural Resource Management
NRMP	Natural Resource Management Programme
ODA	Overseas Development Authority
OPC	Office of the President and Cabinet
PFMP	Participatory Fisheries Management Programme
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PROSCARP	Promotion of Soil Conservation and Rural Production
PS	Principle Secretary
RUP	Resource Use Programme
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SGL	Special Game Licence
SHARED	Services for Health, Agriculture and Rural Enterprise Development
TA	Traditional Authority
TAG	Technical Advisory Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WCRF	Wildlife Conservation Revolving Fund
WDF	Wildlife and Development Fund
WMU	Wildlife Management Unit

GLOSSARY OF COMMON TERMS

Best Practices - Examples of field-based activities, operational procedures or capacity building approaches that are successful and sustainable in social and environmental terms and can be readily adopted by other individuals or organizations.

Capacity Building - An approach to development that aims to instill commitment and improve fundamental management and technical skills within an organization, thereby making the institution more effective and sustainable.

CBNRM Coordinating Group - A body or bodies (as yet undefined) that will have the mandate, support, resources and skills to improve the flow of information about CBNRM activities in Malawi, develop strategic plans and monitor performance and impact of CBNRM initiatives.

CBNRM Secretariat - An operational unit that will provide support services to the CBNRM Coordinating Group(s).

Community - Everybody living within an area. It may be a social or a geographical grouping depending on the context.

Community-based Natural Resource Management - An approach to the use of renewable natural resources that relies on the empowerment of community groups to use those resources as they see fit using strategies arrived at through consensus. In an ideal situation, the use of the resources is sustainable in economic and ecological terms and the distribution of benefits occurs in a manner that is socially equitable. Many practitioners perceive a continuum ranging from strict government control of natural resources through co-management and collaborative management through to CBNRM at the other extreme.

Community-based Organizations - Groups of individuals within a village or group of villages or residential area with similar vested interests that have established an agreement to work together in a structured manner to achieve common objectives

Community Mobilization - The process of building enthusiasm and commitment within a community or group of stakeholders to establish a formal working relationship in order to work together in order to accomplish a common goal.

Community Resource Mapping - The process of identifying the knowledge, skills and other human resources that are available within a community and the quantity and quality of natural resources that are present in the geographical area.

COMPASS Team - Technical project staff including the Chief of Party, Deputy Chief of Party, Community Mobilization Specialist and Information Management Specialist based in Blantyre at the COMPASS Offices.

Conservation - A system that promotes the sustained existence of the natural resources.

Environment (*chilengedwe*) - the specific combination of natural resources in an area.

Monitoring and Evaluation - A management tool that is built around a formal process for evaluating performance and impact using indicators that help measure progress toward achieving intermediate targets or ultimate goals. Monitoring systems comprise procedural arrangements for data collection, analysis and reporting.

Natural Resources (*zachilengedwe*) - Within the Malawian context, forests and woodlands, fisheries and water resources, wildlife (flora and fauna) and soil resources. In the broadest sense, natural resources include rocks and minerals, land, air and wilderness. The last two of these are typically regarded as "common resources", being freely available to all.

Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation - A monitoring and evaluation approach that ensures active involvement of stakeholders and beneficiaries in identifying targets, appropriate indicators, data collection procedures and reporting.

Partners/Partnerships - Different levels of partnership can be identified:

- **Co-operation** is characterized by informal relationships that exist without any commonly defined mission, structure or planning effort. Resources and rewards are separate.
- **Co-ordination** is characterized by more formal relationships and understanding of compatible missions. Some planning and division of roles are required and communication channels are established. Resources are made available to all participants and rewards are mutually acknowledged.
- **Collaboration** implies a more durable and pervasive relationship. It brings previously separated organizations into a new structure with full commitment to a common mission. Requires comprehensive planning and well-defined communication channels operating on many levels. Resources are pooled or secured jointly, as are benefits.

Service Provider - An agency providing managerial and technical assistance to a community in a process of building the capacity of the community to become self-reliant.

Stakeholders - Individuals, communities, non-governmental organizations, private organizations, parastatals, government agencies, financiers and others having an interest or a "stake" in a project or activity and its outcome. *Primary stakeholders* are those ultimately affected, either positively or negatively. *Secondary stakeholders* are the intermediaries in the process of carrying out the programme/project. They may be winners or losers, involved or excluded. *Key stakeholders* are those who can significantly influence, or are important to the success of the programme/project.

Strategic Plan - A road map that outlines the long-term goals of an organization or program and details how these will be achieved by adopting specific strategies, approaches and methodologies.

Sustainability - The ability to continue effectively once direct project/programme support has been taken away. Sustainability can be at many levels but the main focus for COMPASS is on the institutional sustainability of natural resource management initiatives.

Sustainable Development - Progress measured in social or economic terms (or both) that has been or will be accomplished without irreversible environmental degradation or social disruption. The benefits should not only outweigh the social and ecological costs but should

also be founded on a rational use of resources (human and natural) that can be maintained indefinitely or perpetuated based on future conditions that can be reasonably anticipated.

Village Natural Resource Committee - A local organization of duly elected or nominated stakeholders that represents the interests of the community as a whole with respect to the use and management of natural resources. Within the proposed structure of decentralized environmental planning, these committees are expected to report to District authorities on issues ranging from the state of the natural resource base to the planning and implementation of development activities.

Workshop on principles and approaches for community-based management of natural resources in Malawi: an assessment of needs for effective implementation of CBNRM

Ryall's Hotel, Blantyre: November 17th to 19th 1999

1 - Introduction

1.1 - Purpose of the workshop

Over the past few years Malawi has seen considerable progress in developing a policy and legislative framework for community-based management of natural resources. This notwithstanding, it has become evident that potential gaps and weaknesses in several areas threaten to retard or even derail efforts to implement CBNRM as an approach to more effective management of natural resources. In an attempt to address some of these issues, the Environmental Affairs Department (EAD) with the support of USAID/COMPASS organized a workshop at Ryall's Hotel in Blantyre on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, November 17th, 18th and 19th, at which the following topics were discussed:

- elaboration of a set of principles that will help guide and support the implementation of CBNRM activities in Malawi;
- adoption of a coherent approach to providing incentives for community-based natural resource management (CBNRM); and
- coordination of CBNRM initiatives among government, donors and NGOs.

The workshop generated discussion among a wide range of partners and interested parties. The exchange of ideas and opinions helped build consensus on an approach and fine-tune guidelines that we feel will strengthen capacity for promoting the adoption of CBNRM in Malawi. The forum also afforded an opportunity to forge stronger ties between the numerous sponsors and practitioners of community-based resource management activities.

1.2 - Approach

The workshop was organized by the Environmental Affairs Department with logistical support from COMPASS and was co-funded by EAD (with UNDP funds) and USAID/COMPASS. This in itself marked a significant divergence from the usual strategy that donor organizations (and indeed government agencies) work independently especially with respect to financing specific activities. We hope that the approach to organizing this workshop will establish a precedent and model for further collaboration in future.

The proposed strategy for organizing the workshop was to solicit background papers on the key subjects from influential or experienced individuals on the issues to be addressed. Several of these papers were circulated to the invitees well before the start of the workshop¹. It was hoped that these papers would stimulate ideas and generate discussion among the participants. These as well as additional technical and information papers were presented during the first day of the workshop. During the course of the second day the delegates split into three sub-groups to discuss the three fundamental topics outlined above. Each of the groups then presented their finding at a plenary session during which all the workshop

¹ Copies of these background papers are included as annexes to this report.

participants had an opportunity to comment on the suggestions and recommendations of each of the subgroups.

Finally, on the last day of the workshop, the recommendations were reviewed and refined at a plenary session. Separate actions plans were developed in the hope that the recommendations would be used constructively to further the cause of CBNRM in Malawi.

1.3 - *Participants*

A full list of participants, their positions and affiliations is included as Annex 1 of this report. There were 36 participants in all (excluding media representatives invited to the plenary sessions). Of these, 13 were from government agencies, 3 from local government (the City Assemblies), 8 from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), 1 from academia, 1 from the private sector, 7 from donor-funded projects and 3 representing environmental trusts.

2 - *Proceedings of the workshop*

2.1 - *Opening*

Mr. Ben Mbewe, Principle Secretary of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Affairs, and Mr. Ralph Kabwaza, Director of Environmental Affairs, made the official opening speeches.

2.2 - *Technical and informational papers*

During the first day of the workshop there was a series of presentations regarding CBNRM in the SADC region and within different sectors in Malawi.

Mesheck Kapila and **Anax Umphawi** - of COMPASS described the work of the SADC Natural Resources Management Programme and summarized the deliberations and recommendations of the Third Biennial Conference held in South Africa in late September 1999.

Andrew Watson - of COMPASS provided a summary of a background paper prepared by COMPASS that describes the current situation with regard to CBNRM in Malawi and proposes some recommendation for institutional arrangements to improve coordination. A copy of this paper is presented as Annex 2 of this report. It should be stressed that this paper has subsequently been revised on two occasions: first as a result of the deliberations at the workshop and, second, as a result of feedback from the National Council on the Environment to which the second draft was presented in early December.

Sam Kainja - of the Department of Forestry summarized the current situation with regard to co-management and community-based management of forest resources in Malawi. The full text of this paper is included as Annex 3 of this report.

Sloans Chimatiro - of the Department of Fisheries summarized the current situation with regard to community-based management of fisheries resources in Malawi. The full text of this paper is included as Annex 4 of this report.

Humphrey Nzima - of the Department of National Parks and Wildlife summarized the current situation with regard to co-management of wildlife resources in Malawi. The full text of this paper is included as Annex 5 of this report.

Carl Bruessow - Coordinator of the Malawi Environmental Endowment Trust made a presentation summarizing the current situation with regard to incentives and allowances provided by different donor organizations and public-sector agencies. He proposed alternatives to the present untenable state of affairs that are included in Annex 6 of this report.

The following participants made additional informational presentations:

Daulos Mauambeta - Wildlife Society of Malawi described the work being undertaken by WSM at Kam'mwamba in Mwanza East where communities are undertaking commercial production of fruit-juices from indigenous trees.

Jones Njala - described the work of the Mulanje Mountain Conservation Trust.

Excellent Hachileka - from IUCN Harare described the work being undertaken to create a regional database of best practices in CBNRM.

John Balarin - Chief Technical Advisor for the DANIDA Environment Sector Support Programme for Malawi described the programme's approach and the proposed methodology with regarding capacity building and field projects.

C. Lumanga - Projects Officer for European Union (EU) Microprojects described the variety of approaches that have been used to support and encourage the adoption of improved soil conservation measures throughout Malawi and other types of EU development activities.

Jacob Palani - of EAD Microprojects (World Bank funding) described the results of the Pilot Phase and how the implementation of the full programme will commence.

Robert Kawiya - Blantyre City Assembly (nominated by City Assemblies of Lilongwe and Mzuzu) described the work being undertaken by the City Assemblies in the area of environmental protection and management of natural resources.

2.3 - Thematic discussions

At a plenary session at the close of the first day, the delegates proposed that a small working group² prepare a list of discussion topics to be reviewed in a plenary session at the start of the second day of the workshop. The list comprised the following questions:

- Are the proposed administrative structures for CBNRM in Malawi appropriate and adequate?

² The group comprised Roza Fatchi (EAD), Sloans Chimatiro (Department of Fisheries), Humphrey Nzima (Department of National Parks and Wildlife), Sam Kainja (Department of Forestry), Carl Bruessow (MEET) and Andrew Watson (COMPASS).

- Can there be a standardized CBNRM benefit-sharing formula? Is the principle of those that put in the most effort, reap the most benefits appropriate?
- Who “owns” natural resources and who has the right to confer ownership and user rights?
- Based on regional CBNRM experiences is a supportive political climate essential for success?
- Are decentralization and the conferring of ownership and user rights to communities absolutely essential for success?
- What opportunities and constraints will devolution of decision-making AND decentralization create for CBNRM?
- Notwithstanding the need for a legislative and administrative framework for CBNRM, is Malawi ready for it?
- Is there capacity (existing or potential) to provide the technical services to promote and support CBNRM in Malawi?
- How do we and the natural resource users and “owners” determine if the resources are being used in a “sustainable” way?

These questions helped guide the group discussions and were also discussed in the plenary session that started the second day. Some questions were left unanswered for the time being but the full list was reviewed at the closing session on the third day of the conference providing all participants with an opportunity to voice their feelings and opinions.

2.4 - *Small group work*

Many of the questions were addressed in the deliberations of three sub-groups of workshop participants that tackled the following three topics:

- Elaboration of the basic guiding principles for CBNRM in Malawi. A background paper prepared by Andrew Watson (COMPASS) presenting an overview of community-based natural resource management in Africa was circulated to all participants prior to the meeting. A copy is presented as Annex 7 of this report;
- Guidelines for the provision of incentives for encouraging CBNRM in Malawi (see Annex 6 for the background paper); and
- Institutional arrangements for improved coordination of CBNRM implementation activities (see Annex 2 for the background paper).

The results of the deliberations of each of the working groups and refinements suggested by the plenary sessions of the workshop are summarized below.

3 - Summary of recommendations

3.1 - *Guiding Principles*

- 1 - CBNRM producer communities should be the prime beneficiaries.
- 2 - Communities should take the leading role in identifying, planning and implementing CBNRM activities and the roles and responsibilities of other participating stakeholders should be clearly defined.

- 3 - At the local level, CBNRM activities should be managed by democratically elected institutions or committees.
- 4 - The community groups must develop clearly defined constitutions for the institutions or committees.
- 5 - The natural resources being managed, the user groups and the resource boundaries must all be clearly defined.
- 6 - To ensure sustainability, short and long-term benefits directly related to use of the resources should be tangible and obvious to the communities.
- 7 - Arrangements for ownership of resources and the rights to use them should be clear.
- 8 - CBNRM activities must be gender sensitive.
- 9 - CBNRM programmes must promote equitable sharing of benefits and distribution of costs.
- 10 - CBNRM service providers should be supportive of other community priorities and needs even if these differ from the service providers' mandate and agenda.

It was agreed that these principles should be promoted by all organization promoting, supporting or implementing programmes, projects and activities that encourage community-based management of natural resources in Malawi. It was concluded that any body responsible for improving the coordination of implementation activities should be charged with ensuring that these principles are adhered to and promoted as widely as possible.

3.2 - Incentives for encouraging CBNRM

An incentive is defined as: *something provided to an individual or group to encourage, in this case, better management of natural resources*³.

- 1 - Programmes that are demand-driven automatically generate incentives and, therefore, do not require external incentives.
- 2 - Facilitating access to resources providing short-term benefits also acts as an incentive for adoption of longer-term NRM activities.
- 3 - Involvement of communities in projects/programmes from the initial stages encourages belief in ownership and the need for incentives is reduced.
- 4 - The principle of community members receiving incentives for services provided is accepted but funds for this must be generated by the community through benefits accruing from the services provided.
- 5 - There is a need for standardization of allowances paid to service providers.

³ Through adoption of improved management practices.

6 - Incentives can be paid to service providers but must be performance-based.

It was agreed that any specific recommendations must be developed in close consultation with the higher authorities and within a far broader forum. Nevertheless, these fundamental principles should form the basis of any more detailed strategy⁴.

3.3 - Institutional arrangements for improved coordination

1 - Create a “Working Group” attached to Technical Committee for the Environment.

2 - Membership to be based on institutional affiliation: Government, NGOs, private sector, communities/CBOs, and academia.

3 - Government representation: Departments of Forestry, Fisheries, Parks & Wildlife, Water, Land Husbandry, Energy.

4 - Other representation: CURE, Chamber of Commerce nominee, ARET, one traditional leader (Traditional Authority), one local government representative, Centre for Social Research, Malawi Environmental Endowment Trust, one representative of women’s groups.

The mandate and responsibilities of the group remain to be defined but the workshop participants recommended the following:

1 - Mandate: to assess impact of CBNRM.

2 - Mandate: to develop strategic plan for CBNRM.

3 - Mandate: to develop guidelines for monitoring CBNRM.

4 - Terms of Reference of the Group and its Charter to be developed following government approval of the concept and structure.

The meeting's recommendations were synthesized by the CBNRM Task Force and were presented to the National Council on the Environment in early December by the Environmental Affairs Department (Annex 8). The presentation engendered considerable discussion among the Council's members. The Council strongly supported the recommendation that a coordinating body be created but felt that it should be attached directly to the Council itself rather than the Technical Committee for the Environment as the workshop participants had suggested. The NCE directed EAD and the Task Force to revise the recommendations of the workshop. This revision was to include modifications to the Terms of Reference and proposed membership of the coordinating body. Another presentation was made to the NCE at an extraordinary meeting of the Council in early March 2000. The revised recommendations were accepted by the Council and the first meeting of the CBNRM Working Group has been scheduled for March 24th 2000.

⁴ COMPASS has adopted the interim guidelines and arrangements pertaining to subsistence allowances for donor-funded workshops and seminars proposed by the Aid Coordination Group in collaboration with the Department of Human Resource Management and Development. Wherever possible and appropriate, COMPASS extends these arrangements to all other types of field activities including seminars, field visits and exchanges and urges all COMPASS grantees to do the same.

The CBNRM Working Group will comprise 12 members comprising the Principle Secretaries of key Ministries, and representatives of NGOs, academia and the Malawi Environmental Endowment Trust. The body will report directly to the NCE on all matters relating to policies that impinge on CBNRM and will also review the progress and impact of CBNRM activities annually. The Committee will also have the authority to commission technical studies that will help track the impact of CBNRM initiatives in Malawi. While the process of establishing the working procedures of the coordinating unit has not yet reached its conclusion, the process of bringing together all the interested parties and facilitating an open, constructive discussion on this matter is an important breakthrough for COMPASS. The final details of the mandate and make-up of the coordinating body must rest with the institution that is legally charged with making such decisions: this is the NCE⁵. COMPASS has done its part to ensure that as many players as possible have had a voice in the recommendations that have been presented to the decision-makers.

4 - Conclusion

The workshop provided an opportunity to air at least three burning issues relating to CBNRM and have a broad cross-section of interested parties participate in an open debate on these subjects:

- Elaboration of guiding principles and approaches to ensure that these are adopted and adhered to by all parties;
- Establishing some fundamental principles for ensuring that incentives for the adoption of CBNRM encourage participation and ensure sustainability in social and economic terms; and
- Proposing a structure and basic procedures that will help ensure more effective collaboration among all parties in the implementation of CBNRM activities.

It is hoped the workshop will lead to significant progress in all of these areas. The adoption and application of the guiding principles will undoubtedly require the creation of a body that has the mandate to drive such initiatives. The proposed CBNRM coordinating body is likely to command such authority and support if it is attached directly to the NCE as has been proposed in meeting subsequent to the workshop. The adoption of an approach to providing incentives and allowances that can be in a way that is consistent, uniform and equitable will require considerably more discussion within a broader forum. The implications reach far beyond the environmental sector and will require achieving consensus among donors, traditional authorities, government and the political establishment, NGOs and the private sector. This will not be an easy task.

Notwithstanding the real possibility of progress, it is striking that all these issues deal with policy and procedural issues at the national or centralized level. Even more fundamental issues relating to the appropriateness of CBNRM for Malawian communities and their readiness and willingness to embrace the approach remain uncertain. We must now ask the question: What is needed for effective implementation of CBNRM in Malawi?

During the course of the workshop several themes surfaced repeatedly. These can be summarized as follows:

⁵ The NCE operates under the direction of the Minister of Natural Resources and Environmental Affairs and with the administrative support of the Environmental Affairs Department.

- Is there a will and desire for rural communities to adopt CBNRM practices? If not, how can these qualities be instilled in a constructive manner?
- While there appears to be a widespread awareness of environmental problems, there is also a need to build awareness of opportunities for better resource management. Any strategy to accomplish this must incorporate better ways of capturing knowledge and capitalizing on existing skills.
- While there is obvious enthusiasm for environmental protection and conservation in many rural communities, there are few innovative ideas for improved management of resources that can produce tangible benefits that accrue to members in a socially equitable manner. From where or from whom should such ideas emanate? If from "experts" or "outsiders", will community support weaken because of a reduced feeling of ownership?
- Clearly, there is a widespread need for additional resources. These include the need for training in organizational skills and community mobilization as well as technical skills and the need for direct financial support for initiatives. With regard to the financing of CBNRM activities: How can sustainability be ensured? Currently a preponderance of the available funding goes towards allowances and other "incentives": How can this be changed so that more resources are available to implement projects with the potential to be self-sustaining?
- In all of this, how can the needs, desires and knowledge of communities that are reliant on the natural resource base be integrated into planning and implementation of CBNRM?

Many of these issues can only be addressed through changes in the fundamental approach to development in Malawi. The pervasive "relief culture" that many donor organizations and public sector agencies encounter in many parts of the country, stifles efforts to build self-sufficiency and self-esteem within rural communities. Similarly, by focussing on the identification of problems that are hampering development, there is a danger that existing opportunities will be missed and communities will become ever more reliant on the intervention of outsiders to solve their problems.

CBNRM represents an opportunity to break away from this approach to development since it requires the active support and participation of the beneficiaries. COMPASS' role in promoting CBNRM in Malawi will focus largely on the following:

- facilitating community participation by building awareness;
- providing training that capitalizes on existing skills and opportunities;
- delivering support services and resources to groups that are motivated and receptive; and
- ensuring that experiences and lessons learned are shared with decision-makers and other potential beneficiaries of CBNRM.

Annex 1: List of Workshop Participants

NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANISATION	MAILING ADDRESS	TELEPHONE
1. Mr. Ben Mbewe	Principal Secretary (PS)	Environmental Affairs	Private Bag 394 Lilongwe	782 424
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25. Mr. C. Lumanga	Projects Officer	Implementation Unit - EU Micro Projects	P O Box 30309, Lilongwe 3	740 521/740 548
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Annex 2

Institutional Arrangements for Improved Management of Natural Resources by Local Communities in Malawi: An overview with recommendations for more effective coordination of programmes and activities

Andrew Watson - COMPASS

1 - Background

Over the past decade community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) has attracted the interest and support of donors, governments, NGOs and community organizations working in a variety of sectors in many parts of the world. Whether the natural resources are forests, wildlife, fisheries or soil and water, an ever-increasing body of evidence suggests that sustainable use is most likely to be achieved when local communities are involved in developing and implementing management plans. This is not to say that CBNRM is universally accepted as an appropriate approach to resource management or that such approaches are always successful. As with many other innovative approaches to conservation and development, there have been many failures but there have also been some major successes. In many countries, CBNRM has now been integrated into national policy⁶ and practical implementation is well advanced.

In Malawi, national policies that are supportive of community-based management of natural resources are gradually being developed notably the 1996 National Forest Policy and the 1997 Forest Act⁷. However, implementation of field programs has lagged and there is a danger that if this continues it will result in mounting frustration on the part of the potential beneficiaries of CBNRM. Currently, about a dozen international donor organizations and about two dozen local and international NGOs are involved in supporting CBNRM initiatives. It is widely recognized that for CBNRM to be implemented expeditiously and effectively in Malawi, two immediate requirements must be met: first, the coordination among CBNRM promoters and practitioners must be improved; and, second, a national CBNRM policy or guidelines must be established.

In 1997, USAID/Malawi helped initiate a process that was intended to lead to the creation of a Steering Committee to help coordinate all CBNRM activities in Malawi. At a meeting on April 3rd 1997 in Lilongwe representatives of what was at that time the Ministry of Research and Environmental Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture and USAID outlined their views on the goals of CBNRM, and on the mandate, structure and composition of the possible Steering Committee. Despite this positive start, no further progress was made on the creation of a CBNRM coordinating body other than to form a sub-group of donor organizations that are involved in funding natural resource management activities in Malawi⁸. This body meets every month.

In addition to these informational and coordinating meetings, there are quarterly meetings of the donor and NGO community that are organized by CURE. To date, the focus of these meetings has also been to disseminate information about natural resource management activities in Malawi and to promote collaboration among practitioners of CBNRM particularly between donors and NGOs.

⁶ For example, forest policy in the Philippines has put 500,000 ha of forestlands under community management. In Kenya, Namibia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe community-based wildlife management is one of the cornerstone of conservation activities.

⁷ Malawi's National Environmental Action Plan (1995), the National Environmental Policy (1996) and National Environmental Management Act (1996) establish the groundwork for natural resource management policy and legislation. Today, national policies on agriculture, parks and wildlife management and fisheries are awaiting cabinet approval while a comprehensive land policy awaits the completion of the work of the Policy Unit of the Department of Lands and Evaluation

⁸ The NRM donor sub-group is made up of representatives from 13 donor organizations (or embassies) and 4 donor-funded programs; the Director of Environmental Affairs also participates.

Several regular participants at the donor sub-group meetings and the CURE meetings have suggested that these forums already provide adequate coordination among CBNRM partners and, therefore, the creation of an additional coordinating body is unwarranted. Others have argued that the mandate of a Steering Committee or similar body would be far broader than simply facilitating coordination among all the players in CBNRM. Neither the participants at the meeting of the donor sub-group nor the broader NGO community that meets at the CURE quarterly meetings have a mandate to address issues of national CBNRM policy development. Yet these groups (donors and NGOs) should certainly be involved in any such efforts. Hence, there is an apparent need for improved coordination within and across these diverse groups if only to facilitate an open exchange of ideas and opinions regarding CBNRM policy development and policy reform in closely related sectors.

The role of COMPASS⁹ in this dialog concerning improved coordination of CBNRM activities is simply as a facilitator. COMPASS has the technical and financial resources to help build CBNRM administrative capacity but the program will end early in the year 2004. The primary goal of COMPASS is to ensure that Malawian institutions have been sufficiently strengthened by that date that they can take over the operational responsibilities of the COMPASS team.

2 - Purpose and Approach

The purpose of this brief study is to identify what changes, if any, are needed to improve the effectiveness of community-based natural resource management initiatives in Malawi. The present goal is not to enumerate the specific types of changes that may be needed but, rather, to outline what institutional or procedural arrangements may be necessary to facilitate an open dialog among all concerned parties and, thereby, build consensus on what direction is appropriate.

The approach we have adopted is first to carry out a quick assessment of the existing arrangements for coordinating CBNRM initiatives; second, to identify several possible alternatives; and, third, to propose some viable options that we hope will generate discussion leading to consensus on the roles and mandate, structure and functions of a CBNRM coordinating body in Malawi. To accomplish this, Andrew Watson the COMPASS Chief of Party met with key members of the donor and NGO communities and with government representatives who are actively involved in CBNRM in Malawi¹⁰. Their opinions were solicited and various options and alternatives for improved coordination of CBNRM activities were discussed. The opinions and recommendations presented here represent a synthesis of these discussions that are presented objectively and, it is hoped, in as neutral and impartial a manner as possible.

3 - Assessment of the current institutional arrangements

⁹ COMPASS (Community Partnerships for Sustainable Resource Management in Malawi) is a USAID-funded program that focuses on building administrative capacity, improving information exchange, increasing community awareness and facilitating grassroots policy advocacy.

¹⁰ The following individuals were contacted: Mr. Ralph Kabwaza (Director of Environmental Affairs, MOFFEA), Mr. Leonard Sefu (Director of National Parks, Ministry of National Parks, Ministry of Tourism, Parks and Wildlife), Mr. Robert Kafakoma (Director of CURE), Mr. Daulos Mauambeta (Director of the Wildlife Society of Malawi); Ms. Etta M'mangisa (UNDP), Mr. Steven Machira (USAID), Dr. Harry Potter (DfID), Ms. Kim Jenkins (US Peace Corps) and Mr. Jacob Palani (EAD/Micro-projects).

The Environmental Management Act (1996) clearly specifies which individuals and organizations are responsible for all aspects of natural resource management in Malawi. The Act is unequivocal in stating that:

It shall be the duty of every person to take all necessary and appropriate measures...to conserve natural resources and promote sustainable utilization of natural resources....

The Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and Environmental Affairs is mandated by the Act to:

...formulate and implement policies for... the conservation and sustainable utilization of natural resources; [to] co-ordinate and monitor all activities concerning...the conservation and sustainable utilization of natural resources; [and to] prepare plans and develop strategies for... the conservation and sustainable utilization of natural resources, and facilitate the co-operation between the Government, local authorities, private sector and the public in... the conservation and sustainable utilization of natural resources.

It is one of the functions of the National Council for the Environment (NCE) to advise the Minister on all matters and issues affecting natural resource use and to:

...recommend to the Minister measures necessary for the harmonization of activities, plans and policies of lead agencies and non-governmental organizations concerned with...the conservation and sustainable utilization of natural resources.

The NCE's membership¹¹ comprises the Permanent Secretaries of 20 Ministries, the General Managers of the Bureau of Standards and the National Herbarium, a representative of the National Commission for Women in Development, a representative of the University of Malawi, a representative of the industrial sector and one NGO representative¹². It is striking that not only is there an overwhelming dominance of the public sector but that parties whose interests lie in the natural resource sector are markedly underrepresented. So, despite the Environmental Management Act's significant emphasis on conservation and sustainable utilization of natural resources, only three members of the 28-person NCE can be said to have strong, direct interest in sustainable management of Malawi's natural resources¹³.

Today in Malawi *de facto* coordination of CBNRM activities is being undertaken through essentially informal mechanisms such as the monthly meeting of the donor sub-group that deals with natural resource management issues and the quarterly meetings of NGOs and other interested parties that are organized by CURE. These forums are extremely valuable for disseminating information about current or proposed activities. This notwithstanding, there is no formal link to the bodies that are legally mandated to coordinate activities and develop policy (namely the Minister and NCE) other than through the presence of the Director of Environmental Affairs (DEA) who is the Secretary to the NCE and sits on the donor sub-group and is invited to the CURE quarterly meeting.

¹¹ The President appoints the Chairman of the NCE; the Director of Environmental Affairs is the Secretary to the Council.

¹² The General Manager of Plan International represents the NGO community.

¹³ Only the Secretaries for Natural Resources and Environmental Affairs, for Agriculture and Irrigation and for Water Development can be said to provide direct representation of the natural resource "sector".

In effect, though the existing arrangements for coordination among CBNRM promoters and practitioners through the regular exchange of information are extremely valuable, they do not adequately integrate policy makers. Conversely, advocates of improved natural resource management are woefully underrepresented in policy arena. It is critical that any arrangements for more efficient coordination among key players must address these shortcomings.

4 - Alternative institutional arrangements

In the foregoing paragraphs we have endeavored to show that the existing institutional arrangements for coordination of CBNRM activities fall short of what is needed to provide a well integrated structure that is capable of dealing with all aspects ranging from implementation of field activities to national policy reform. The option of continuing "business as usual" is not a viable alternative.

The attempt in 1997 to create a National Steering Committee to provide direction to CBNRM efforts and coordinate the activities of a wide range of players was appropriate at that time since Malawi was just beginning its experiment with this new approach to natural resource management. Many players in the donor and NGO communities were embarking on innovative programmes that would require the support and collaboration of partner organizations if they were to be successful. These were the early days when the potential for co-management of resources and the likely impact of administrative decentralization were unknown. Undoubtedly, the benefits of cooperation and collaboration remain but today many strong relationships between donors and government, between NGOs and Communities have been forged and, arguably, the need for a centralized management body has diminished.

As outlined in April 1997, the CBNRM coordinating body's suggested mandate included the following:

- ◆ To develop a workplan of action for implementation of CBNRM activities;
- ◆ To direct the course of events and set priority areas for CBNRM; and
- ◆ To identify funding mechanisms for implementation of CBNRM activities.

Such roles and responsibilities are in keeping with the mandate of a Steering Committee for a programme being implemented on a national scale. The question that we must ask is whether the CBNRM programme being implemented in Malawi on the threshold of a new millennium would benefit from a strong, controlling influence. The predominant opinion among the individuals that were polled is that a body with such a mandate is no longer either appropriate or necessary because a significant degree of coordination and collaboration is already being achieved through the donor sub-group and quarterly meetings of CURE. Nevertheless, there are other important functions that these forums cannot perform owing to their limited membership and mandate. These include:

- ◆ Ensuring that CBNRM is taken into account in new legislation and policy reform;
- ◆ Developing guidelines for benefit sharing within communities;
- ◆ Building consensus and ensuring compatibility in the approaches and methodologies adopted for implementing CBNRM activities;
- ◆ Monitoring and assessing the impact of CBNRM; and
- ◆ Ensuring equity in the geographical and socio-economic scope of CBNRM interventions.

The question that we will address here is whether a body such as a Steering Committee should be created to tackle these matters or whether some other organizational arrangement would be more appropriate.

There is currently a profusion of Steering Committees dealing with various environmental programmes and projects in Malawi¹⁴. Some of these committees operate well while others have encountered problems due to poor attendance of members or because the mandate and functions of the body are unclear. In very broad terms, committees that have between about eight and twelve members meeting three or four times a year appear to have been most successful¹⁵. Clear and concise terms of reference and a membership that comprises the same individuals from meeting to meeting are prerequisites for success. While most committee members represent institutions rather than being nominated as individuals, it is widely acknowledged that each organization should specify which individual will be its representative on a committee rather than rotating its representative.

Another important consideration is the type of individuals who are nominated or co-opted to sit on the committees. In some cases, when the committee is mandated to address policy and management issues, senior decision-makers are appropriate - though often it is difficult to schedule meetings to ensure that most of these individuals can attend. In other cases, if technical matters and implementation issues are to be addressed, technicians and mid-level managers are more appropriate committee members. In the case of coordination of CBNRM in Malawi, a strong case can be made for both these options.

Recently in Malawi, there has been a move away from the more traditional structure and mandate of the Steering Committee. With the development of national policies that address different sectors of the environment, a programmatic rather than project-based approach to planning is more appropriate. A result of this is that bodies that help define broad policy directions are more valuable than managerial committees that assist in planning and steering an agenda over a relatively short period of time. The National Agroforestry Steering Committee, for example, appears currently to be at a point of transition where its role is being supplanted by the need for more policy direction for the various programmes than management oversight. An important lesson here is that any committee or other body must be required to reassess its own role and worth periodically and, if warranted, dissolve itself.

5 - A proposal for institutional arrangements for improved coordination of CBNRM

In view of the involvement of diverse organizations and interest groups in CBNRM issues in Malawi it is essential to have broad participation in the dialog on policy matters and implementation issues. The fundamental importance of sustainable natural resource management in Malawian law and its necessity for the wellbeing of most Malawians warrants creation of a structure that will allow citizens and grassroots organizations a voice in shaping national policy. While we are reluctant to encourage further profusion of committees and meetings, we feel that the formation of two new bodies closely affiliated with two existing entities is justified.

¹⁴ The Malawi Environmental Management Project and the World Bank-funded Micro-Projects have Steering Committees, as do the National Agroforestry Programme, the European Union's Social Forestry Programme and USAID's NATURE Programme. There are also Steering Committees involved in overseeing implementation of the international conventions on Desertification, Biodiversity and wetlands (the Ramsar Convention).

¹⁵ This is not to say that some larger bodies operate less efficiently. Both the NRM donor sub-group and the NCE have enjoyed high attendance rates despite having more than 20 members.

The first of these should be a Technical Advisory Group (TAG) that meets in conjunction with the quarterly meeting of NGOs and other CBNRM practitioners. The Group should present the results and recommendations of its deliberations on technical issues to the participants at the CURE forum. It should also act as a voice for the forum to present recommendations to the second CBNRM coordinating body.

This second body should be a sub-group of the National Council for the Environment that meets to discuss CBNRM policy issues. The group should present the results and recommendations of its deliberations on policy issues to the National Council thereby facilitating policy reform by putting important issues before the body that is mandated by law to address such matters.

5.1 - Roles and responsibilities of the two bodies: both the Technical Advisory Group and the NCE sub-group should have clear and succinct terms of reference and a charter that spells out each body's mandate, structure, functions and operating procedures.

The mandate of the TAG should focus on the following:

- ◆ Ensuring that CBNRM programmes and activities are supported by scientifically rigorous monitoring of performance and impact;
- ◆ Ensuring that a broad representation of natural resource user groups participate in discussions of CBNRM policies, methodologies and approaches; and
- ◆ Helping establish guidelines for benefit sharing that are both equitable and practical.

The mandate of the NCE sub-group should include the following:

- ◆ Developing a national policy for CBNRM and ensuring that this is taken into account when other sectoral policies are elaborated or reformed;
- ◆ Developing a strategic plan for CBNRM;
- ◆ Establishing procedures for coordination of CBNRM activities; and
- ◆ Undertaking an annual assessment of the impact of CBNRM in Malawi and, if warranted, recommending appropriate policy adjustments to the NCE.

5.2 - Composition and structure of the two bodies: both groups should be made up of a manageable number of members representing as broad a range of interested parties as possible.

It is suggested that the TAG be made up of 10 members. Two representing NGOs (nominated by the NGOs attending the CURE quarterly meeting; two representing the donor community (nominated by the donor sub-group); two representing the Government (nominated by the NCE or the Minister of Natural Resources and Environmental Affairs); two representing the private sector (nominated by the Malawi Chamber of Commerce); and two representing research organizations or specific CBNRM projects or programmes.

The CBNRM sub-group of the NCE should be made up of four key members of the NCE: the Secretary for Natural Resources and Environmental Affairs or his representative; the Secretary for Agriculture and Irrigation or his representative; the Secretary for Water Development or his representative; and the representative of the National Commission for Women in Development. An additional six members should be co-opted to represent each of

the following groups: NGOs, donors, the private sector, research organizations, the chiefs and the regional authorities. The same bodies that nominated the representatives on the TAG should nominate these additional members. If appropriate, members of the TAG should be eligible to sit on the NCE sub-group representing the same interest groups.

5.3 - Functional arrangements: the meetings of these two CBNRM coordinating bodies should be synchronized with the quarterly meetings of CURE and the NCE. The TAG should report to the CURE forum; and the sub-group should report to the NCE. Ideally, the sessions of the TAG and NCE sub-group should be organized at the same venue, immediately before or the day before the corresponding meeting of the parent body¹⁶. It is felt that such an arrangement would not only improve the exchange of information between the two groups and their respective parent bodies but would also reduce the demands placed on the time of the group members and on financial resources.

An important task for both groups will be to assess periodically whether their mandate and functions remain pertinent to the objectives of promoting CBNRM in Malawi. The Environmental Management Act [section 23 (2)] states that:

No person shall implement a development activity or project in any district otherwise than in accordance with the district environmental action plan for the district in question.

In effect, the task of coordinating CBNRM policies, strategies and activities in Malawi will eventually fall to a body that will require strong representation of the district authorities. It is possible that both the TAG and NCE sub-group as envisaged in this document will have to be replaced or significantly modified in order to meet this requirement. For this reason, the charter for each group should include a "sunset clause" that allows for the dissolution of the group once its stated objectives have been accomplished. Notwithstanding the possible temporary nature of the two groups, there is an immediate and pressing need for improved CBNRM administrative capacity in Malawi and it is felt that the creation of bodies along the lines of the TAG and NCE sub-group described here is of paramount importance.

6 - Next Steps

There are at least five important issues that will have to be addressed before any action can be taken to create a CBNRM coordinating body (or bodies) and organize their first formal meetings.

6.1 - Who will be responsible for deciding what alternatives are appropriate? The Environmental Affairs Department has made a provisional offer to organize a workshop or forum at which these recommendations will be discussed. The goal of this meeting will be to reach consensus among as broad a constituency as possible on which option and format is most appropriate.

6.2 - Who will be responsible for advocating for the selected option? Since the Director of Environmental Affairs is the Secretary of the NCE and is responsible for reporting the

¹⁶ It is acknowledged that the quarterly forum organized by CURE is not a formal organizational entity. This notwithstanding, the TAG should be required to present a brief report on its deliberations to the participants at the meeting.

Council on the status of natural resources and furnishing the council with information¹⁷, he should convey the findings and recommendations of the aforementioned forum to the NCE.

6.3 - Who will provide the Secretariat? This is an extremely important consideration that will require further detailed discussion among key partners. It is possible that COMPASS could provide the services of a Secretariat on an interim basis but, in the interests of sustainability, it will be essential to identify another institution that is willing and able to perform this function

6.4 - How will financing be assured? The costs associated with organizing the quarterly meetings of the TAG and the NCE sub-group and the financing of the operations of the Secretariat cannot be ignored. The failure of several Steering Committees in the recent past has been attributed to lack of financial resources. It is anticipated that donor funding will be essential at the outset and it is hoped that the donors that currently fund CBNRM capacity building activities will be willing to contribute additional sums to cover the costs of the supplementary meetings. It should be noted, however, that by piggybacking the meetings of the TAG and NCE sub-group with the regularly scheduled meetings of the parent bodies, additional costs associated with travel and accommodation would be minimized. The costs associated with running of the Secretariat can be borne by COMPASS but in the medium to long-term alternative sustainable financing mechanisms will have to be identified and secured.

6.5 - Who will be responsible for developing the Terms of Reference and the Charters? Once again, providing assistance to accomplish this task is within the mandate of COMPASS. Financial resources for providing technical assistance and some logistical support are available.

¹⁷ Environmental Management Act [section 9 (2) (c)].

Annex 3

Community-based Natural Resources management in Forestry Sector

S. Kainja - Department of Forestry

COMMUNITY BASED NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN FORESTRY SECTOR

Background

The Forestry Policy encourages the Director of Forestry to enter into forest co-management agreements with the private forest industry or any other individuals or entities in the management, protection and utilization of its plantations or forest reserves.

The Forest Act (CAP 63.01), Part IV, Sections 35-37, establishes the legal basis for the Director of Forestry, under the authority of the Minister, to enter into forest plantations agreements with any NGO, or community that may wish to undertake afforestation activities in forest reserves or plantation areas.

Co-management is a partnership between Government on one hand and a Non Government party, working together to promote sustainable management of tree and/or forest resources. The Non Government party could be a community with or without the support of a third party. In this partnership, the Government role is primarily to offer technical services on tree/forest management and/or forest regulations. In some circumstances Government might provide necessary inputs to support tree and forest management. The role of the NGO/ Communities is to develop and implement tree/forest management plans consistent with forest policy and in a manner that ensures sustainable provision of goods and services accruing from trees/forests.

The popular use of the word co-management in tree/forest resources in about a decade old. However, the principle and practice of co-management dates back to colonial era when villages were required by Government to set aside a forest area on customary land. The practice died a natural death after independence, probably because it had colonial negative connotation.

The concept and practice of co-management in forest /tree management has over the years developed under such names as community forestry, Social Forestry or participatory forestry. The common factor about these forest management practices is a significant change of policy from a blue print type of forest management planned, implemented and enforce by the Government to serve Government interest

to a partnership where interests of both Government and community are taken on board in an integrated fashion, in support of sustainable management of forest/tree resources.

Co-management in forest management is a major shift in forest management history. It's ripples have precipitated changes in forest training, research, extension, policy and forest legislation. These has also been a process of institutional review revisiting the roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders.

Forest co-management has been implemented on pilot basis in Nkhatabay, Kasungu and Machinga Districts. New co-management sites are currently being established in various forest reserves in the country. The initial approach has targetted forest reserves as a means of fostering responsible attitude towards forest resources by increasing benefits accruing to surrounding communities without endangering sustainable management. This balancing act is a tricky business.

Principles of co-management are also been implemented on customary land, especially in the Northern Region where there are natural forests on customary land.

Co-management goal

The goal of forest comanagement is to sustain the contribution of the natural forest/tree resources to the upliftment of the quality of life in the country by conserving the resources for the benefit of the nation. The emphasis is on responsible use of forest/tree resources so that future generation can also enjoy the same benefits.

In this process facilitation of functional local institutions to oversee forest resource management is central. Also important in the advisory monitoring role of Forests Department in technical matters on forest/tree management and forest regulations.

Lessons learnt from so far

1. Sustainable Management concept in multiple product scenario is quite complex process. The concept of sustainable forest management has been developed in a

mono product scenario. There is need to develop new means of assessing sustainability in multiple products scenario.

2. Understanding of forest policy and legislation is often low for both Forestry Department staff and local communities, resulting in unsustainable management of forest/tree resources.
3. It is important to work through locally accepted committees in order to foster ownership of the interventions in the area and promote sustainable local interest.
4. Provision of massive inputs into communities is unhealthy because it is unsustainable. It is important to promote use of materials and technical knowledge that is already available in the area.
5. There is need for close supervision of Village Natural Resource Committee performance and the impact of the implemented action plans.

Future for co-management in forestry

While appreciating potential pit falls in forest resource co-management, there are lessons that have been learnt during the pilot of forest co-management. Regardless of which part is the country, the following considerations are important:

1. Need for Systematic Client Consultation exercise using PRA tools in order to identify forest management problems, analyse them and develop management plans action, taking into consideration all stakeholders and constraints.
2. There is need for a local institution that will oversee the continued dialogue, implementation Monitoring and Evaluation of the action plans. The local institution will need the support of Forestry Department on technical matter with reference to forest/tree management and regulations guiding forest management in the country.
3. At community levels there is need for shared rules and regulations stipulating roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders, sharing of benefits and mechanism for resolving conflicts. These should represent the consensus of the participating community.

4. There is need to look the action plan, involving all stakeholders. There is also need to inform the DDC.
5. There is need training needs assessment for both Forestry Department staff, Village Natural Resources Committee members and Communities followed by organisation of relevant training. Possible areas for focusing could be as part concept of co-management, forest policy and regulation leadership and group dynamics.
6. To harmonise policies on co-management it is necessary to establish a co-ordination committee represented by all stakeholders participatory in co-management in natural resources sector with Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Affairs as the Secretariate. The stakeholders should include NGOs in the National Resources Management Sector.

Conclusion

In conclusion, forest co-management is probably the only viable option. In order for sustainable forest resources management. In order for it to work, there is need for public awareness and dialogue in order to establish a shared vision in the community, commitment from both the Government and the community and also alot of coordination, harmonisation and team work among all cooperating partners facilitating and supporting Community Based Natural Resource Management initiative. Hard work is required, but I believe that in due season, we shall reap a harvest of sustainable supply of forest goods and services that will enrich the lives of communities: this is the challenges in the new millenium.

Annex 4

Community-based Natural Resources Management: A Case of Participatory Fisheries Management in the Lakes Malombe, Chilwa, Chiuta and Upper Shire Valley

Friday Njaya & Sloans Chimatiro - Fisheries Department

COMMUNITY-BASED NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT : A CASE OF
PARTICIPATORY FISHERIES MANAGEMENT IN THE LAKES MALOMBE,
CHILWA, CHIUTA AND UPPER SHIRE RIVER

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1.0 Introduction

The management of fisheries resources in Malawi has gone through some changes since the declaration of the British colonial rule by changing from the traditional fisheries system to the centralised regime and the recently introduced co-management fisheries management system. The centralised regime has experienced a number of difficulties due to various factors such as the increased population; characteristics of the fishery in terms of its ecological and biological complexities; environmental changes which have periodically affected certain fisheries such as those of Lake Chilwa, implementation of regulatory measures for entry into the fishing industry; inadequate surveillance, monitoring and control of fishing activities; lack or little opportunities for alternative forms of income sources; increased population growth rate and limited consideration of other dimensions apart from biological studies in the fisheries system. Consequently, fish stocks such as the most important commercially viable cichlids (*Oreochromis* spp.) which is locally called *chambo*, have been declining, particularly, in the south-east arm of Lake Malawi, Upper Shire and Lake Malombe.

In 1995, Lake Chilwa dried up. This resulted in the collapse of all three commercially important stocks of endemic *Sarotherodon shiranus chilwae* (Trewavas) locally called *makumba*; the minnow, (cyprinid) *Barbus paludinosus* (Peters), known locally with other small fish as *matemba*; and catfish (clariid) *Clarias gariepinus* (Burchell) which is locally called *mlamba*. In Lake Chiuta, *Sarotherodon shiranus* stocks declined due to operation of fine meshed open water seine nets (*nkacha*) by migratory fishers.

The decline of the fish stocks, therefore, necessitated a refocus of the fisheries management regime in Malawi. It was until 1993 when the concept of 'co-management' was adopted. This resulted in the implementation of a pilot Participatory Fisheries Management Programme (PFMP) on Lake Malombe and Upper Shire River to reverse the

declining rate of the fisheries resources in the water bodies. The strategy in implementing the PFMP involved setting up of a Community Liaison Unit (CLU) composed of fisheries extension staff and Beach Village Committees (BVCs) representing the fishing communities. This was to bring about a shift from formulating fisheries policies based on biological considerations in a 'top-down' approach to a system whereby the resource users participate in formulating the policies in a 'bottom-up' approach.

With the adoption of the co-management approach for Lake Malombe and Upper Shire River, some positive results have been yielded such as improved relationship between the Fisheries Department and the user community, participatory licensing and enforcement activities and formulation and review of fisheries regulations by the fishers. Lessons drawn from the PFMP were applied to manage the fisheries resources in Lakes Chilwa and Chiuta. The fisheries co-management programme for Lakes Chiuta and Chilwa have also generally resulted in improved fish landings and fish recovery respectively. A major improvement has been noted in terms of the relationship between the user communities and the Fisheries Department and the enhanced capacity and responsibility of the local institutions as extension agents.

2.0 The concept of 'co-management'

Fisheries managers pursue multiple goals. Rarely is the task of fisheries management defined in biological terms only. There are also social and economic concerns. The reason is obvious: capture fisheries management - as opposed to aquaculture - is aimed at people, not fish.

What is 'rational' at societal level may be intolerable at local level. What is efficient from an economic perspective may be socially and culturally harmful. Also, what makes sense in biological terms may be unwise in social and economic terms. All things considered, a maximum sustainable yield is not necessarily the optimal yield (Jentoft and McCay, 1995). This results in conflicts among various user groups and policy objectives governing utilisation of fisheries resources in Malawi with particular reference to the artisanal sector.

Co-management as defined by Sen and Nielsen (1996), is an arrangement where responsibility for resource management is shared between the government and user groups. It is considered to be one solution to the growing problems of resource over-exploitation as the concept focuses on the recognition that user groups have to become more actively involved in fisheries management if the regime is to be both effective and legitimate. This concept has recently emerged on the premise that the effectiveness of the centralised fisheries management system in maintaining or achieving sustainable utilisation is persistently debated and questioned as some fish stocks in certain localised fishing grounds continue to be either fully exploited or in crisis as was the case with Lake Malombe and Upper Shire River around early 1990s.

Participation, as defined by Campbell and Townsley (1996), is the active, meaningful and influential involvement of individuals or groups in an activity. In the context of fisheries co-management, it means that individual fishers or fisher groups and other agencies through various forms of structures are actively involved in the management of fisheries resources. If management is to succeed (Wilson et al, 1994), fishers must support management efforts; and that support will be realised if they have evidence that

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regulations are working in their best interest. Individuals who are required to engage in short-term sacrifice in order to obtain collective (or private) long-term benefits need to be assured that their sacrifice really will have a positive impact on the health of the resource otherwise there can be no perceived long-term benefit.

However, as observed by Jentoft and McCay (1995), the degree of user group involvement may differ from one country to another. Correspondingly, the organisational set-ups may also vary. The two extremes are: (1) government power, and (2) fishers' power. In the first instance, fishers are at the receiver's end as fisheries management is entirely a top-down process. At the other extreme, fishers have full control. They organise and run their own management system, either through institutions that are basically informal or by means of a formal organisation, like a committee or co-operative.

3.0 The Participatory Fisheries Management Programme (PFMP) for Lake Malombe and Upper Shire River

Lake Malombe and the Upper Shire River lie between latitude 14° 21' to 14° 45' south and longitudes 35° 10' to 35° 20' East (Figure 2). They are part of the Great Rift Valley system. Lake Malombe is shallow, averaging 4m in depth, about 30 km in length with a maximum width of 15 km. The Upper Shire River, about 12 km long, flows from the southern tip of Lake Malawi before widening to form Lake Malombe (Figure 2).

The surface area of Lake Malombe is approximately 390 km² and is fed by water from Lake Malawi. The lake is further enriched by streams flowing into the lake from its highly populated catchment area and by recycling of nutrients in sediments as a result of the shallowness of the lake. Lake Malombe is therefore, much more productive than Lake Malawi. In 1988, when the fishery was near its peak, the lake produced about 15,500 t of fish, approximately 17% of Malawi's total production.

Lake Malombe fishery is dominated by two major fish groups, namely, *Oreochromis* spp. and *kambuzi* (*Haplochromis* spp.) (FAO 1993). This fishery has shown rapidly declining catches of *chambo* (from about 8,300 tonnes in 1982 to less than 100 tonnes in 1994), representing a considerable loss in income levels of the fishers (Figure 3). The total catch value, as reported by Wilson (1993), had fallen from about MK36 million in 1982 to about MK8.4 million in 1990.




Figure 1: Estimated annual fish production (tonnes) for Lake Malombe

The cichlid (*Oreochromis* spp.) comprises three species. All are mouth brooders, which mature at about 30 cm. The taxonomic status of most *kambuzi* species is not yet clear. They are quite small (maximum 12 cm) maturing at about 5 to 6 cm and have low fecundity. Recruitment is strongly related to the size of the adult stock, thus being capable to high fishing pressure (Tweddle et al, 1994). Other species appearing in commercial catches are mainly catfish like *Clarias gariepinus*, *Bagrus meridionalis* (locally called *kampango*) and certain Cyprinids like *Engraulicypris sardella* (locally known as *usipa*).

Table 1: Fishers operating in Lake Malombe

Year	Fishers	Gillnets	Chambo Seine	Kambuzi Seine	Nkacha Seine
1988	2454	474	11	77	157
1989	2768	453	15	101	144
1990	2077	440	6	56	186
1991	2731	402	6	84	255
1992	3069	583	6	75	227
1993	2206	358	3	49	227
1994	2698	201	3	50	247
1995	3267	510	4	52	263
1996	2231	280	1	29	205
1997	3274	681	0	34	214

The 1997 annual frame survey results (Table 1) showed that an estimated 420 gear owners and 2854 ancillary workers (3274 in total) operated in Lake Malombe in 1997 while in the Upper Shire River a total number of 87 gear owners and 776 ancillary workers were recorded operated in the water body.

The fishers were using 475 planked boats and 112 dugout canoes (Fisheries Department, 1997). Gill nets are the most frequently used gear type along with *nkacha* nets (off-shore *kambuzi* seine nets), which account for approximately 99% of fish landings from the lake.

The major socio-economic occupation for the communities of Lake Malombe and Upper Shire River is artisanal fishery which include *Oreochromis* spp. and *Haplochromine* spp. However, *chambo* and *kambuzi* have suffered a decline in recent years and the situation is very critical for Lake Malombe and Upper Shire River.

3.1 Recent fisheries research studies on Lake Malombe and Upper Shire

The problems associated with the management of artisanal fisheries in Malawi were first outlined by the FAO/UNDP funded Chambo Research Project. The project was implemented from 1988-1992 in the South East Arm of Lake Malawi, Upper Shire River and Lake Malombe. In its concluding remarks, the report (FAO/UNDP, 1995) considered its findings as presenting an alarming picture as *Oreochromis* spp. in Lake Malombe had collapsed due to indiscriminate capture of juveniles by fine-mashed seine nets. For the same reason, *Haplochromide* spp. was then in danger of becoming overfished. The estimated annual fish production for Lake Malombe which was about 12000 tonnes around 1980s was reduced to nearly 5000 tonnes early 1990s (Figure 3). The overall value of the Lake Malombe fisheries had declined substantially, and with them, fisherfolk incomes. In the Upper Shire river and South East Arm of Lake Malawi all commercially important stocks were fully exploited. This meant no further increases in fishing could be sustained, and hence a management strategy was needed as a matter of urgency.

These project findings gave way for a new fisheries management option. A management plan focusing on community participation or co-management, termed as the Participatory Fisheries Management Programme (PFMP) for Lake Malombe and Upper Shire, as a pilot project, was drawn up in 1991. Other field base line surveys conducted by Bell and Donda (1992) were supported by the Fisheries Department and GTZ-Malawi Germany Fisheries and Aquaculture Development (MAGFAD) Project. The Fisheries Department and the local community have been implementing the management plan with funding from the GTZ, FAO/UNDP, ODA and World Bank-Fisheries Development Project with varied areas of support in the PFMP.

3.2 Previous attempts to address the problems

It is important to note that no regulation, which does not have support of the fishing community, would be effective and complied with. A number of management measures were introduced by the Fisheries Department (FD) to regulate entry into the fishery, protect breeding and juvenile fish by observing closed seasons and legal mesh sizes. It proved very difficult to enforce such regulations because resources have been inadequate for the activity.

3.3 The implementation of the PFMP

3.3.1 The set-up of the PFMP

In the design of the PFMP, extension was considered a core component, followed by research and income generating activities components. However, with time it was observed that enforcement by BVCs was not, in some cases, effective.

On the other side, the newly formed Lake Malombe Fishers' Association is to act as a link between the BVCs and the proposed Fisheries Board.



-----	:	Co-ordination/linkage not fully functional
-----	:	Co-ordination/linkage fully functional
MoALD	:	Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development - provide technical knowledge to individuals or groups on tomato growing as alternative income generating activities (IGAs)
MBC	:	Malawi Broadcasting Corporation
MRFC	:	Malawi Rural Finance Company - a lending agency for IGA groups
PMEU	:	Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit
DC	:	District Commissioner
DDO	:	District Development Officer
ADC	:	Area Development Committee
FD	:	Fisheries Department

This resulted in the participatory enforcement and licensing component. The Lake Malombe and Upper Shire Fishers' Association or BVCs arrange for patrolling in certain areas where they observe there are illegal fishing cases or use of illegal gears. They also collect fishing lice fees from the fishers.

3.3.2 Formation of the Beach Village Committees (BVCs)

As a strategy, implementation of the Participatory Fisheries Management Programme on local level involved setting up of the community level institutions (BVCs). This was meant to establish a two-way channel of communication between the user groups and the Fisheries Department. They were considered to progressively assume responsibility for the management of the fishery. To this effect a total of 31 BVCs around Lake Malombe and Upper Shire River were formed.

3.3.3 Composition

The Beach Village Committees were selected by the beach village groups and each BVC is composed of the following:

- (a) Village heads
- (b) Gear owners.
- (c) Crew members.
- (d) Any active member of the village group.

3.3.4 Roles of the Beach Village Committees

After several meetings, the fishing communities through the BVCs came up with the following roles:

- (a) Each Beach Village Committee should control a named beach or beaches. The officers of the BVC and the members of the group it represents should be listed with their gear.

- (b) The Beach Village Committees should control admission of additional gear owners to the group.
- (a) The Beach Village Committee should control the use of each beach and thus limit access.
- (d) The Beach Village Committees should be prepared to expel members who do not comply with the Beach Village Committees instructions, especially regarding closed season, gear specifications etc.
- (e) The Beach Village Committee should organize group members to discuss the problems of the fishery and to reach decisions on how to solve them.
- (f) The Beach Village Committee should represent its members at higher level e.g. the recently formed Lake Malombe and Upper Shire Fishermen's Association which has the support of all the committees.

3.3.4 Training of the BVCs

After the formation of the Beach Village Committees, three-day training sessions were conducted at Mpwapwe Fisheries Training College in 1994. There have been biannual workshops since 1994 during which some Fish Resource Management issues are presented. There are also numerous field meetings by the BVCs and study tours within Malawi, especially to community-based fisheries management areas such as Mbenji on Lake Malawi have been conducted. In 1996, as Table 1 shows, two local leaders and a BVC member participated in a study visit to Zambia and Zimbabwe and one local leader has also been participating in SADC Regional Natural Resources Management Programme by visiting some countries within the region.

3.4 The historical timeline of major activities

The following Table 6, shows some of the major activities conducted during implementation of the Participatory Fisheries Management Programme for Lake Malombe and Upper Shire River.

Table 2: The historical timeline of major activities

MAJOR EVENT	WHEN	WHAT	HOW
1. Results of <i>Chambo</i> Fisheries Project	1992	Some of the results showed dwindling <i>Chambo</i> stocks and habitat degradation	By conducting a biological research
2. Introduction of 'participation concept'	1992	Decline of <i>Chambo</i> stocks due to non-compliance of fisheries regulations, increased fishing effort etc.	Draft concept paper by ODA
3. Study on Situation Analysis (Bell and Donda)	1993	Socio-economic study focusing on the impact of overfishing on the fishers	Based on questionnaire and interviews
4. Project initiation	1993	Workshop on project formulation for 1 week by consultant and facilitator	Involving Fisheries Department and fishers' representatives
5. Awareness	1993	Sensitising fishers on the need	Conducting meetings in fishing

campaigns		for participatory approach to fish stock management i.e. enforcement, formulating fisheries regulations etc.	villages
6. Training of field staff	Sept., 1993 and June, 1994	Trained on leadership skills and group dynamics for BVCs	Residential training for 1 month
7. Formation of BVCs	1993-94	Mobilising fishers into committees of 10 with local leaders as co-opted members to represent interests of the fishing community and serve as vehicles for dissemination of extension messages	Facilitation by involving Fisheries Extensionists and Community Development Assistants
8. Training of BVCs	Feb. 1994	Training in Leadership Roles and Group Dynamics by Community Development Staff for effective performance of office bearers and cohesiveness of the committees	Residential training for 1 week
9. Formation of Community Liaison Unit	1994	Forming a group of Fisheries Extensionist to bridge the gap between FD and fishers	Regular field visits or contacts and monthly and annual meetings
10. Formulation of regulations	1994-95	Change of <i>Nkacha</i> mesh size (19 mm), register of fishers and enforcement activities (by FD and BVCs)	Meetings between CLU and BVCs
11. Sensitisation meetings of political, religious and local leaders	1996 and 1997	Issues on the implementation of PFMP (formulation of regulation by BVCs) were raised and areas of support from the leaders were also identified	Workshop for 3 days
12. <i>Usodzi wa Lero</i> Programme	July, 1996	Medium for exchange of views on fisheries matters by fishers and FD	Involving the FD and fishers in disseminating messages through use of radio
13. Harmonising constitution	1997, Oct.	Involving all BVCs in a workshop and agreeing on one constitution	BVC biannual workshop
13. Visits to Zimbabwe and Zambia	1995 and 1996	All CLU staff and some BVCs' representatives and one local leader participated in the tour	Field visits and consultations with user communities in those countries
14. Hosting of international workshop	March, 1997	Most of SADC member states took part to review project framework on co-management and also to share ideas	Workshop for 3 days
15. IGA activities	1995	The IGA Expert was involved in facilitating formation of IGA groups and training of the groups	Meetings and field visits and conducting training workshops by the IGA Expert and MRFC
16. Formation of Fishermen's Association	Oct., 1997	Elections were conducted by all BVCs' representatives	Workshop for 2 days
17. Enactment of Fisheries Conservation and Management Bill	Oct., 1997	The Act includes local participation, resource ownership and empowerment of communities as some of new sections	The Bill was tabled in Parliament

Source: FD/OMS (1998)

In the historical timeline above, the major highlighted activities include drafting of the community participation idea, setting up various institutions, capacity building and establishment of a legal framework.

3.5 Collaboration

There are main collaborating partners in the Lake Malombe and Upper Shire River PFMP as indicated in the following Table 7.

Table 3: Key collaborative partners of the PFMP

Type of Agency	Key Agency	Collaborative Roles
Government Ministry/Dept	Ministry of Forestry, Fisheries and Environmental Affairs - Fisheries Department	Implementing the PFMP - management (policy formulation), counterpart roles, planning, monitoring, co-ordination, research, enforcement, extension, IGA, enforcement, etc.
	MoALD	-Technical knowledge on growing rain-fed tomato growing for IGA group
	Ministry of Justice	Drafting new and reviewed policy and legislation
	Dept. of Forestry	-Technical know-how on afforestation
	Dept. of Parks and Wildlife	-Supporting bee-keepers IGA group
Donors	GTZ-MAGFAD	-Development and dissemination of extension messages -Capacity building of staff and BVCs -Malombe loan fund -Funding a fisheries radio programme 'Usodzi wa Lero' -Afforestation programme
	UNDP/FAO	-Technical experts in extension and IGAs -Project equipment i.e. vehicles, computers, fax, video etc. -Developing IGA component and supporting women's programme -Supporting research programme -Capacity building
	ODA-FRAMS Project	-Supporting ecological studies on Lake Malombe -Supporting socio-economic studies around Lake

		Malombe
	GOM/IDA-Fisheries Development Project	-Institutional capacity building -Extension activities -Enforcement activities
Financial institution	Commercial Bank of Malawi	Provision of funds for Lake Malombe Loan Fund with support from MAGFAD
	Malawi Rural Finance Company (MRFC)	Loan disbursements to groups of either men or women for alternative and supplementary income sources apart from fishing
Media/Press	Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (Radio 1)	Producing and broadcasting Usodzi wa Lero programme (extension) with support from MAGFAD

Source: Scholz et. al (1997) and Njaya (1998)

3.6 General status of the PFMP

The UNDP/FAO (1994) reported that the benefits of the PFMP could not be assessed in years but rather in decades. The report gave an example of the change of undermeshed *kambuzi* seines to 19 mm which in short run, would lead to less catches but in long-term, with improved compliance of regulations, more catches could be realised. However, the following are some of the positive aspects of the PFMP.

- (a) Most fishers have changed their *nkacha* seines mesh sizes to 19 mm from using fine meshed and non-selective ones. However, research conducted on the impact of the 19mm reveal that the gears still catch immature *kambuzi* (more than 60%). This gives an explanation for further dialogue and discussion on this between the Fisheries Department and the BVCs/Association.
- (b) There is an improved relationship between the Fisheries Department and resource users. This enables the BVCs to participate in enforcement of the regulations such as mounting patrols during closed seasons and licensing gears.
- (c) Use of transfer letters by migrating fishers around Lake Malombe and Upper Shire has a direct bearing on entry limitation. Some BVCs such as Mtela demand authorised transfer letters from any migratory fisher. The migratory fisher may be accepted after producing a transfer letter signed by his BVC and local leader after checking his *nkacha* seine that it complies with the recommended regulations.
- (d) On the fish catches, it may be too early to comment. The decline of catches continued further from 1993 to 1995 when the PFMP started, probably concurring with FAO/UNDP (1994). In 1996 there was an improvement in the catches (about 4000 tonnes). However, the 1997 catches (2800 tonnes) as Figure 3 shows may not give a thorough indication because of the change of the closed season by the BVCs. This means that the fishers closed the lake to operating active gears for six months, that is, from January to March and then from October to December. Another point is that the remaining six-month fishing period may not give a true reflection about the fishery as from May to July Malawi experiences Southern (*mwera*) winds which affect fishing operations.

Obvious Signs of Success of Participatory Fisheries Management

Beach Village Committees (BVCs) are very active in the Lakes Chilwa, Chiuta, Malombe and Malawi, and the Upper and Lower Shire Rivers. There are a total of 48 BVCs in Lake Chilwa; 12 BVCs in Lake Chiuta; 33 in Lake Malombe and Upper Shire; 27 in the Lower Shire and 45 in South of Lake Malawi. The BVCs are a successful social asset in the fishing communities because of reasons outlined in Table 2 below.

Table 4: Success attributes of the various water bodies

Success Attribute	Location				
	Chilwa	Chiuta	Lower Shire	Malombe *	Malawi *
Allocating fishing areas	✓	✓			
Settling fishing disputes	✓	✓			
Formulation and enforcement of regulations	✓	✓		✓	✓
Help the craft-less to access fishing crafts			✓		
Design a fish stock recovery programme for Lake Chilwa after recession in 1995	✓				
Afforestation programme	✓			✓	
Control of water hyacinth			✓	✓	
Conserve fish				✓	✓
Transfer of extension messages and technologies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Monitor fish stock levels	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Negotiate credit/loans		✓		✓	✓
Collect license fees on behalf of govt.	✓				

Source: Chimatiro (1998)

Remarkable attributes of community participation through the BVCs in all water bodies in the Southern Region is improved participation of the communities in decision-making regards the fisheries. In the Lower Shire, communities are involved in helping those fishermen who do not own canoes, to borrow from others, at a token fee. This helps improve the well being of the resource-poor fishers, who can not afford their own investment into fishing crafts (Chimatiro, 1998).

The capacity of the BVCs must be strengthened by training them in group dynamics; and within the framework of the new Fisheries Management and Conservation Act (1997), they must be trained in aspects of their roles in fisheries management and conservation.

3.7 Major problems encountered

3.7.1 Promises

The issue of sitting allowances for BVC members constantly came up during meetings with BVCs as was promised by the government, but later the decision was changed for sustainability. However, with constant persuasive civic education the BVCs have slowly come to understand their roles as partners in community development work for which they should not expect payment. The idea of using part of license fees need consideration for funding some of their activities.

3.7.2 Corruption

Corruption among some of the local leaders has been reported by their BVCs or association. Some corrupt local leaders allow certain fishers to operate their gears during closed seasons. In cases where the authority could undermine efforts of the BVCs, illegal-fishing cases are very common either during closed season or operating illegal gears (seines with less than 19 mm mesh sizes). However, with persistent attack during the annual BVC workshops, the corruption cases are now reduced.

3.7.3 Dependency on external support

The Lake Malombe and Upper Shire River PFMP implementation has largely been depending on external support based on various projects. This arrangement could counter progress of the programme especially with respect to specific time frame of the projects. Already the ODA and UNDP have phased out their support leaving GTZ at hand over phase and IDA/World Bank also closer to handing over phase. Although government was supposed to contribute to every day operations it has not been able to do so because of financial problems (Hara, 1996). Its major contribution is only in terms of salaries of staff working on the programme.

3.7.4 Delayed legal framework process

Delayed setting up of a legal framework for the community level institutions (BVCs or association) has affected performance of the PFMP. Establishment of a legal framework is necessary to support the PFMP activities. There are several issues, which will require a careful planning, and implementation. Issues like resource ownership, cost-sharing mechanisms, community participation in enforcement of regulation and community empowerment requires further clarification with support from the Ministry of Justice. As the control of entry into Lake Malombe and Upper Shire River fisheries appears to be a crucial element, the fishing communities in those areas need to take up the responsibility of control. The legal framework needs to be established. As observed by Bruce (1996) community resource management is often undermined when adequate legal bases have not been provided for common property. Common property is most simply defined as ownership by the community. It seems that the irreducible minimum for common property to exist is to have a community, and for it to be holding a property right. For the community to be legally secure in that property, it must have 'legal personality,' the

ability in the eyes of the state to hold a property right. For this to be effectively implemented capacity building needs to be considered.

It is still difficult for the BVCs to limit access or grant access rights to fishers operating on Lake Malombe and Upper Shire River. However, a positive step has been the enactment of the new Fisheries Conservation and Management Bill in October, 1997.

6.0 Potential of the participatory fisheries management in Malawi

There is potential in the participatory approaches to fisheries management in Malawi. It is important to encourage such fisheries co-management initiatives for increased legitimacy of regulations and building up of sound relationship between an outsider (the government) and the insider (fishing community). Considering stages of fisheries co-management in Malawi with respect to the PFMPs for Lakes Malombe, Chilwa and Chiuta, it may be difficult to categorise them according to the co-management type or stage as outlined by Sen and Nielsen (1996). However, Lake Malombe PFMP appears to be of *consultative* type as for any policy decision by the government with respect to the management of fisheries resources in Lake Malombe and Upper Shire, is made after consulting the community. For example, issues of change of mesh sizes, artificial reefs, and change of closed season were suggested by the Fisheries Department but after consulting the BVCs, it was finally recommended by both parties to formulate new regulations following such recommendations.

The Lake Chiuta PFMP may be classified as *advisory* at the start of the programme in the sense that most of the regulations such as ban of all shore seines and mesh size of gill nets were set up by the fishing community themselves. The community had to call the government as its partner to assist in fish resource management of Lake Chiuta. However, after intervention of the government, the co-management arrangement has now become *consultative*. This was after the BVCs were trained in group dynamics and some of the issues, which affected setting up of Lake Chiuta Fishers' Association. It is still not clear whether some of the messages imparted to the community during the training sessions had distorted the whole arrangement. After training, the BVCs demanded provision of loans to procure gillnets while before that they were able to purchase the nets from sell of fish caught in fish traps.

The Lake Chilwa PFMP may be classified as *consultative* as issues concerning the participatory recovery of the collapsed fish stocks after recession, were from the government and the local leaders were consulted for implementation. However, after refilling of the lake, the co-management appears to be between the local leaders representing community and the government. This is an issue in need of further study, as there appears to be two scenarios in terms of fisheries co-management in Malawi as outlined by Njaya (1998).

Scenario 1: This is where key partners in the fisheries co-management is between the Beach Village Committees with local leaders playing advisory roles on one side, and the government on the other. This is the case with PFMPs on Lake Malombe and Upper Shire River and Lake Chiuta.

Scenario 2: This involves a fisheries co-management arrangement whereby the key partners are the local leaders representing the fishing community with Beach Village

Committees as enforcement units on one side, and the government on the other. This is the case with Lake Chilwa.

It may not be easy to note differences in these scenarios. However, these scenarios may have an impact on decision making and legitimacy of fisheries regulations.

One of the important features concerning fisheries co-management is size of the water bodies where such programmes are being implemented. The size ranges from 200-1850 km². This makes somehow easier for communities and individual fishers to know where they are from. The use of a transfer letter indirectly controls access to a fishing right. This, in a way, may be a way of controlling entry. The local traditional structure includes village heads, group village heads and traditional authorities. This enables these leaders to meet at various functions or ceremonies that may enable them to discuss issues concerning fisheries in their localised areas. However, it may not be easy to develop fisheries co-management on Lake Malawi, which is the largest water body with more diverse fisheries aspects. Therefore, some studies are necessary to understand how the co-management programme may work out there in future. However, in isolated areas field reports indicate that some local leaders have already started participating in fisheries management. For example some local leaders are proposing ban of some fishing methods such as *chiombela* (driving fish into gill nets after beating water), cast nets, undermeshed gillnets, *kauni* (use of open water seine net meant for targeting either *utaka* or *usipa* to catch *chambo*) and *nkacha* gears. It is therefore evident from these reports that there is also potential for implementing such co-management initiatives on Lake Malawi.

Some of the most important issues or features about the PFMP areas in Malawi are outlined in Table 5. These features may assist in studying implementation issues in terms of policy and design, achievements and lessons for future participatory approaches, if conclusive remarks of such PFMPs after ten years will be a success. More lessons are needed at present when the Fisheries Act and Policy has now focused on community participation in fisheries management.

Table 5: Major differences on features among Lakes Malombe, Chilwa and Chiuta

Feature/Issue	Lake Malombe	Lake Chilwa	Lake Chiuta
Estimated size	390 km ² (L. Malombe and 15 km long for Upper Shire River)	790 km ²	200 km ²
When co-management was started	1993	1995	1995
Major results	-Recovery of declined <i>Chambo</i> and <i>Kambuzi</i> fish stocks and sustainable utilisation of fisheries resources	-Recovery of collapsed fish stocks after recession by conserving all riverine stocks for natural restocking of the lake after refilling	-Eviction of <i>Nkacha</i> seine fishers
Which partner started	Fisheries Department	Fisheries Department	Fishing community
Key partners	Beach Village Committees with local leaders as advisors and Fisheries Department	Local leaders with elected Beach Village Committee and Fisheries Department	Beach Village Committees with local leaders as advisors and Fisheries Department
Number of BVCs	31	31	9
How the co-management started	-Lessons from other countries	-Drawn lessons from Lake Malombe PFMP	-Drawn lessons from Lake Malombe PFMP

	-Meetings donors' conditions of support	-Applying local development self-help spirit initiative	
Number of fishers (gears owners and crew) in 1994	2698	6096 (1043 gear owners and 5053 crew)	1471 (652 gear owners and 819 crew)

Source: Njaya (1998)

7.0 Conclusion and recommendations

The co-management arrangement as an alternative option to fish resource management in Malawi and a social asset to fishing communities around Lakes Malombe should be promoted. It may in long-term be cost-effective on the part of government's expenses on the enforcement of fisheries regulations. In some cases the BVCs serve as vehicles through which extension messages and community needs may be assessed within limited time. Legitimacy of fisheries regulations formulated by the resource users is enhanced and hence there is minimal illegal fishing. However, the process of consultation and collaboration in decision making sometimes delays certain activities and programmes. This may be addressed with good planning, co-ordination and availability of all necessary resources. In Malawi, the participatory fisheries management needs to be supported in all aspects such as legal issues, capacity, income generating activities, gender consideration, research programmes and participatory extension skills. More lessons however are yet to be learnt for future improvement of the on-going PFMPs and in designing other co-management programmes for other water bodies.

It should be noted that fisheries co-management arrangement might not be applicable to all water bodies. Secondly, it is not a solution to all problems associated with fish resource management. It is just an alternative approach to management of the fisheries resources. It is, therefore, important that more studies are conducted to understand each partners' expectations, socio-economic situation of the communities, biological status of the fish stocks, cultural aspects and technological development of such fisheries. Fisheries co-management may not succeed in certain areas such as an area where it is just used for landing or marketing and where there are no indigenous people to work for the benefit of such a fishery.

Since co-management is a new idea, there is still a lot to learn for the benefit of both the local institutions (BVCs) and the Fisheries Department, especially the extension staff. It is important that some form of training opportunities be made available to enhance capacity of the co-managing partners. The PFMP should also involve non-governmental organisations such as the Co-ordination Unit for the Rehabilitation of Environment (CURE) for more technical skills.

The Fisheries Department should, without delay, implement the enacted Fisheries Conservation and Management Act that focuses on community participation with legal empowerment and resource ownership as significant attributes. However, there is need to handle the legal issues with caution as any left out gaps will have repercussions on the success of the co-management programmes. The government also needs to be ready to respond to needs of the communities. Participatory research may be of benefit to the BVCs for capacity building.

Evaluation of the co-management arrangements is recommended to draw a number of lessons for further improvement of the PFMPs. Issues like composition of the BVC members, roles of local leaders, constitution, extent of participation and corruption by some local leaders and BVCs and limiting access to reduce the increasing effort should to be highlighted for future improvement of the on-going programmes and in designing other co-management programmes.

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Annex 5

Wildlife Sector Community-based Natural Resources Experiences

Humphrey Nzima - Department of National Parks & Wildlife

INTRODUCTION

The management of wildlife in Malawi has been characterized by the policy of "fines" and "fences" which emphasizes state control and exclusion of other stakeholders, especially rural people who shoulder the highest proportion of the cost of living with wildlife. For a variety of socio-economic and ecological reasons, this approach is neither effective nor desirable. Consequently, there has been a shift from the strictly preservationist approach to a more collaborative management approach in which DNPW shares with other stakeholders rights, responsibilities and decision-making related to wildlife management (Birini-Fareyaband, 1997). The goal of the CM approach is to proactively manage wildlife resources and ecosystems on a sustainable basis in a way that all stakeholders are able to meaningfully and voluntarily contribute as well as derive optimal benefits. CBNRM is seen as a component of the collaborative management approach that emphasizes rural people as primary stakeholders.

This paper attempts to summarize the CBNRM implementation experience of the Department of National Parks and Wildlife.

Ecological Conditions

The basic strategy for wildlife management in Malawi is a system of protected areas. The Department of National Parks and Wildlife (DNPW) is currently responsible for the management of five national parks and four wildlife reserves with a total area of 11,923 km² or 11.6% of the total land area. However, Malawi's protected areas are biological islands without any buffer zones, dispersal areas or game management areas. These areas are under severe pressure owing to high population densities, dependence on subsistence farming, and depletion and degradation of natural resources outside protected areas. Although biological diversity is high, densities of large mammals are generally low. The large herbivore carrying capacity of eastern savannas varies in the range of 2,000 to 20,000kg/km². The prime determinants are rainfall and soil fertility (Bell, 1983a). Malawi stands in the lower half of this range. Carrying capacities of large mammals in its parks and wildlife reserves are in the order of 1,500 to 10,000kg/km² and the Brachystegia woodland that cover most of the woodland parts of the country cannot support more than 2,000kg/km². These factors place severe constraints on the nature and scope of CBNRM activities in Malawi. For example, the CAMPFIRE and ADMARE models, which rely on the presence of high large mammal concentrations occurring on customary land, are not applicable to Malawi conditions.

WILDLIFE SECTOR CBNRM PROGRAMS

Efforts to involve rural people in wildlife management started in the late eighties with the introduction of bee keeping in the protected areas of the northern region of Malawi. The bee-keeping project aimed at promoting environmentally friendly technologies and was seen as providing incentives for conservation. This earlier CBNRM attempt was followed by several initiatives primarily revolving around collection of selected wildlife resources from protected areas. The resources involved in what has become to be known

as the resource use program (RUP) include caterpillars, thatch grass, firewood, mushrooms, termites, medicinal plants, fish and other minor forest produce. These initiatives have recently been expanded by the introduction around Nyika and Vwaza Wildlife Areas of a revenue-sharing program in which revenue generated from these areas is shared between DNPW, border zone communities and Treasury. Border zone communities have usually used money from this program for community projects such as school blocks, water supply, maize mills, and clinics.

POLICY ENVIRONMENT

Major policy and legislative reforms in the area of environmental and natural resources management have recently taken place under the Strategic Objective 2 of the Nature Program. A framework environmental policy and Act are in place. Further, major natural resources sector policies and legislation are/will be reviewed with a view to incorporating a broader role for communities, NGOs and the commercial sector in managing natural resources. The decentralization policy of 1993 and the local government bill passed in 1998, which generally devolved government to the district level, may have positive effects on CBNRM programs. With reference to the draft wildlife policy, three main features are significant for community-based initiatives:

- ♦ The granting of utilization rights to those who legitimately use the land on which wildlife occurs, although the ownership continues to be vested in the state
- ♦ The recognition of the importance of equitable distribution of benefits and revenues derived from sustainable utilization of wildlife resources from national parks and wildlife reserves amongst Treasury, local communities and the Department of National Parks and Wildlife;
- ♦ The recognition of the importance of sharing responsibilities, rights, benefits and accountability with rural communities, NGOs and the private sector;

However, an objective way of determining the stage Malawi has reached in the process of creating enabling policy environment for CBNRM is to gauge the extent to which policies and laws embrace emerging CBNRM principles (Murphree, 1993). In this regard, the following points can be made about the stage of development of an appropriate policy environment for CBNRM (Table 1).

- ♦ The negative incentive structure arising from the high human/resource ratio makes it difficult to give the wildlife resource a focused value (i.e. for the benefits to exceed cost of management);
- ♦ Early community-based initiatives (e.g. Bee keeping project and its forerunner, the BZDP) do not make it a requirement on the part of beneficiary communities to make a contribution to wildlife management as a condition for benefiting. This is in violation of the principle that the magnitude of benefits should be related to the

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quality of management. Current emphasis on agreements within the framework of CM should rectifying this shortfall

- ♦ The poor rating on local control reflects the limited formal role communities have in making independent decisions over local wildlife resources. Use rights for instance have been sanctioned only to a limited extent in that all decisions relating to where wildlife may be harvested, in what amounts, when, by whom and how are ultimately the prerogative of the State. This is certainly the case where protected areas are concerned
- ♦ The principle of differential burdens being related to differential benefits appears to have been captured at policy and program level. The border zone concept is intended to address this concern. However, recent suggestions that communities as far as twenty kilometers away from a protected area boundary may be covered by the border zone concept may dilute this principle.
- ♦ Natural resources committees, which represent producer communities, are normally 10-15 people in size. In some instances however, because of the limited scope of benefits, NCR's are the sole beneficiaries. This situation translates into a few people being granted sanctioned use rights and may result in increased illegal and unsustainable use of wildlife resources

Constraints and opportunities of the current political, economic and ecological parameters have shaped the relatively unfavorable environment for wildlife-focused CBNRM initiatives in Malawi (Table 1). Nzima (1997) described the policy environment in Malawi as poor but improving. However, it must be emphasized that most wildlife-focused CBNRM initiatives in Malawi must necessarily take place around and inside protected areas, state land, as wildlife outside these areas is largely depleted. On the other hand, Murphree's CBNRM principles apply to common property regimes.

Table1: schematic analysis of five policy framework in relation to Murphree's 5 principles for CBNRM (Malawi not part of original analysis)

	Botswana	Namibia	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Malawi
Giving resource focussed value (benefits should exceed costs)	+	#	+	+	0
Differential burdens result in differential benefits	+	#	+	+	+
Magnitude of benefits should reflect quality of management	+	#	0	+	0
Unit of proprietorship should be unit of production, management and benefit	+	#	0	+	0
Unit of proprietorship should be as small as possible within socio-political constraints	+	#	+	#	+

Source: Riboy (1995)

KEY

Principal does not apply - 0

Principle endorsed as explicit policy - #

Principle is being applied - +

Agriculture and Land Tenure Policies

Outside wildlife policy, there are many policies that affect CBNRM programs. Agriculture and Land Tenure policies appear to pose the biggest threat to protected areas management and hence CBNRM programs. Around Kasungu National Park, policies which promoted the transfer of land from communal to private ownership were identified as detrimental to conservation (Bell, 1993). Similarly, Sahn and Arulpragasas (1991) suggested that land and agriculture policies that favored the estate sub-sector over the smallholder sub-sector contributed to land shortages as well as harming the objectives of poverty alleviation in Malawi. A recent study within the border zones of Nyika and Vwaza revealed that the negative impacts the proliferation of estates in the zones has on various socio-economic groups (displaced communities, non-displaced communities and landless communities) translates into serious threats to the integrity of these areas unless sustainable use practices are promoted (Kogelheide, 1999). However, it would seem that the establishment of estates, in some cases, has been halted on the initiative of chiefs rather than as a result of government policy. Where this is not the case, it would seem appropriate that the granting of title to large pieces of land should be preceded by an environmental and social impact assessment. This requirement can be introduced either in the Environmental Management Act or the National Parks and Wildlife Act, for the latter only where land transfers are anticipated near a protected area.

Proprietorship over Wildlife

Under revised policy and legislation, wildlife remains the property of the Malawi Government. The notion of proprietorship implies a sanctioned use right whereby local communities can decide where and how to use the resource and to benefit from the it in the way they choose (Rihoy, 1996). In the Malawi context, utilization rights are granted to those who legitimately use the land on which wildlife occurs. On public land, where most of the wildlife occurs, this limited devolution of control seems necessary to ensure the primary objectives of conservation are secured. Thus, the resource use program is largely state controlled.

Rights and Obligations

Access and utilization rights are the dominant forms of rights under wildlife-focussed CBNRM programs. Tied to the question of rights is the issue of responsibilities. Rights and responsibilities are conceptually linked – one erodes without the other (Murphree, 1993). However, in wildlife-focussed CBNRM programs, the issue of responsibilities does not clearly come out (Nzima, 1997). In the draft agreement for Resource Utilization Program under the Border Zone Development Project for instance, community obligations are listed as:

- ◆ Establishment of community based organization
- ◆ Adherence to legislation, especially provisions of the National Parks and Wildlife Act
- ◆ Adherence to general rules, harvesting quotas and methods

- ♦ Assistance in data collection, including setting of quotas;

Although the above are obligations on the part of communities, they do not amount to active contribution toward park management. There is little mention of any management activities that communities might undertake in *exchange for* the right to utilize wildlife resources inside protected areas. Except for the cost of living with wildlife (i.e. forgone opportunities and property damage by wildlife), rural communities are not required to sufficiently invest in protected area management. It is interesting to note that in the conservation based criteria for project selection, quality of management effort has been included. However, this is an area that requires improvement. There are many management activities that communities can take part in. These could include: fire control, provision of information on illegal activities, fence maintenance, to mention a few. It is important that both rights and responsibilities are clearly spelled out in management agreements that must be monitored and enforced from the communities' and DNPW's sides. For the rights to be seen to be secure, agreements must have legal recognition.

INCENTIVE STRUCTURE

The basic hypothesis underlying CBNRM Programs is that, for a community to manage its resource base sustainable, it must receive direct benefits. These benefits must exceed the perceived cost of managing the resource and must be secure over time. The nature and scope of incentives must therefore be a key feature of successful CBNRM Programs.

The notion of benefits has recently evolved to include such factors as a sense of ownership, cultural/heritage values, and food security in addition to purely financial returns. DNPW has tended to promote the following categories of activities:

- ♦ Co-management of protected areas through community representation on management bodies;
- ♦ Revenue generation within protected areas, (e.g. Conventional tourism, safari hunting, live animal sales etc.), followed by transfer of a proportion of revenues to adjacent communities through a community fund
- ♦ Sustainable use of protected area resources by adjacent communities (e.g. thatching grass, poles, and firewood, plant foods, medicinal products, fish, mushrooms, termites etc.)

There is a wide range of CBNRM activities that would support wildlife conservation objectives which do not fall under the direct control of DNPW. Activities in the Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry sectors are particularly important. Strong

institutional linkages with these and other sectors is required to enhance wildlife conservation objectives

Adequacy of Incentives

The objective of introducing community-based programs is to increase satisfaction with protected areas of local people by introducing adequate incentives. Satisfaction with protected areas is expected to be reflected in increased co-operation and lawful behavior. By the same token, reducing or removing incentives must result in increased conflict and unlawful behavior.

Incentives can be said to be adequate when they exceed the cost of resource management. Malawi has a relatively limited resource base. Compared to neighboring countries, Malawi has the lowest ratios of resources per head of population in terms of land, wildlife, protected areas, and cattle (Table 2). Besides, the bulk of wildlife resources occurs inside protected areas, with little left on customary land. Consequently, sustainable use of natural resources within protected areas can contribute to the economy of a relatively minor proportion of the population.

Table 2: Resource ratios, Southern Africa

Parameter	Malawi	S. Africa	Zimbabwe	Zambia	Botswana	Namibia
People per sq. km.	122.32	32.9	38.0	10.6	2.2	1.9
People per cow	11.0	3.5	1.7	2.8	0.5	0.8
People per elephant	5500.0	4021.3	142.5	200.0	16.3	200.0
People per sq. km of protected area	611.1	555.0	220.0	36.0	5.7	14.0

Source: ULG Consultants (1997)

It must be noted that incentives are inadequate even in the context of border zone communities. Although the potential for bee keeping shows promise (Table 3), the large number of beekeepers clamoring to join this activity means per capita income will significantly fall. In the Kasungu National Park Area Program, anticipated cash benefits were much lower than in the Malawi-Germany Bee Keeping Development Project (MGBDP). Per capita benefits were estimated at a mere US \$6 per annum (Bell et. al., 1993). In a more recent assessment of the monetary value of the Resource Use Program in Nyika and Vwaza, Seidel (1998) estimated per capita income of US \$4 per annum. With a rapidly increasing population within the border zones, cash per capita benefits must be expected to eventually decline to the level of protected areas where CBNRM Programs are absent.

This reasoning equally applies to other kinds of benefits. For example, the collection of forest products such as firewood, thatching grass, caterpillars, tubers and medicinal plants within the context of the resource use program typically involves a small fraction of the border zone communities. In the KNPAMP, only a small fraction of the potential target group (20,000 people out of 120,000 people) were to be involved in the planned resource use program. The total number of beneficiaries around Nyika and Vwaza was estimated at 180,000 (Bannerman, 1997). Although there is room for expansion of the program, it is unlikely that the program would accommodate this large border zone population. *The RUP in Malawi must therefore be regarded as a complementary strategy of community initiatives taking place outside protected areas. In particular, broader CBNRM initiatives must focus on restoring and strengthening the sustainability of agricultural systems, as this is considered to have greater impact, in terms of both number house-hold level beneficiaries and protection of the environment (ULG Consultants, 1997).*

In spite of the negative ratio between people and resources, it has been suggested that placing an economic value on the resource can create real incentives for managing that resource. An early attempt to do this was carried out by Munthali and Mughogho (Table 1) in which they recorded higher gross margins from bee keeping and caterpillar collection compared to those from subsistence farming. More recently, Seidel (1998) carried out a more comprehensive financial assessment of RUP in Nyika and Vwaza. He estimated the total value of RUP in Nyika and Vwaza to be respectively MK800, 000 and MK900, 000. The gross margins of agriculture crops grown under subsistence farming systems were found to be comparable to those under RUP. To enhance the economic value of wildlife resources, the following measures were proposed:

- ◆ Economic assessment of wildlife resources should be integrated into ecological monitoring systems. Seidel (1998) describes the methodology for economic assessment of wildlife resources included in RUP. Hess etc. al (1996) and Hess and Koehler (1997) developed systems for monitoring the impact of resource collection on the resource base as well as the setting of quotas. A recent Resource Utilization Manual provides guidelines on monitoring and evaluation of RUP
- ◆ Value should be added to appropriate harvestable resources through processing and proper storage. Simple processing and storage techniques should be explored. Regional and national markets for some of the products should be explored
- ◆ Capacity should be developed in research staff and CBOs in areas of data collection and analysis and market research;

Table2 : Gross margins (US \$/ha) for a number of enterprises

Enterprise	Value (US \$/ha)
Caterpillars	92.99
Bee-keeping	132.59
Tobacco (flue cured)	504.89
Maize (all types)	38.66
Beans (all types)	20.44
Ground nuts	33.64

Source: Munthali and Mughogho (1992)

Table 2: Expected and Actual Income Earned by Bee keepers under MGD

Year	Beekeepers	Expected income (US \$)	Actual income (US \$)	Per capita income
1989			3764	
1990	170		3788	22
1991	600	12706	7176	13
1992	788	12706	7333	9
1993	801	13846	8233	10
1994	980	16615	7520	8
1994	980	16560	9773	10

Source: Nzima (1997)

Nature of Incentives

There appears to be general agreement that since household level benefits are unlikely to have a significant impact, community level benefits should be emphasized in the context of Malawi CBNRM programs. The Border Zone Development Project places considerable emphasis on provision of social infrastructure such as bore holes, school blocks, clinics, maize mills, to mention a few. That the community fund is called "infrastructure fund" is a reflection of this emphasis.

However, the notion of compensation through provision of social infrastructure has recently been challenged. The general feeling appears to be that these types of incentives do not have the intended conservation effect (Rihoy, 1995). The first problem is that compensation measures are not immediately linked to the presence of protected areas. Several suggestions have been made to enhance the wildlife-benefit linkage. Some of the suggestions include labeling of development infrastructure with DNPW logo and increased awareness and education programs about these linkages within the Border Zone Communities. Recently, conservation based criteria for project selection has been developed. These are good suggestions, but the fact remains that the connection between border zone development and conservation is artificial (Kiss, 1990). The second problem associated with provision of social infrastructure as incentives is that they are public goods. This creates a free-rider problem in which individuals continue to behave unlawfully while receiving community level benefits (Gibson and Marks, 1995). The free-rider problem is likely to be acute in situations of high population pressure, pervasive poverty and resource scarcity, a situation that is currently prevalent in Malawi. All these factors notwithstanding, the provision of infrastructure holds the long-term prospects of stimulating economic development in border zone communities. Moreover, provision of social infrastructure can provide an entry point into communities that have historically had poor relations with park authorities, a situation that precisely applies to Malawi. However, overall, activities with the potential effect of reducing pressure on protected area resources such as IGAs and promotion of sustainable agriculture should receive preference over social infrastructure.

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Local level Institutions as Co-managers

In Malawi, as in many other developing countries, planning and decision-making is usually "top down." The current hierarchy is as follows:

- ◆ Central government level
- ◆ Local government (District council/Assembly and District Executive Committee)

- ♦ Sub-district level (Traditional Authority, Area Development Committee and Area Executive Committee)
- ♦ Village level (Group Village Headman, Village Development Committee, and village committees for various sectors including health, forestry, wildlife, fisheries)

It is now generally agreed that the locus of decision-making in natural resources management should be at the lowest possible tier, the tier that causes and experiences problems, and has knowledge and understanding of the resources. In wildlife management this tier has generally been taken to be the village and its multiplicity of committees, including wildlife committees. Experience working with these local level institutions reveals the following problems:

- Lack of legal empowerment which limits the ability of local institutions to:
 - Exercise exclusive rights over prescribed natural resources
 - Enter into contracts with other parties
 - Receive donations
 - Raise funds
 - Enforce laws, rules and regulations
- Lack of resources
- Inadequate technical and administrative capacity

The last two problems apply equally to the Department of Parks.

The question of legal empowerment is addressed in the draft policy and Act. Questions of capacity require resources and expertise both of which are in short supply within DNPW. It is hoped that the collaborative management approach being pursued will go along way toward addressing some of the capacity constraints.

Other stakeholder Institutions and Forums

Realizing that CBOs require both horizontal and vertical support, DNPW is promoting the formation of consultative/advisory forums at park level and at national level. The park level forum, the Local Advisory Committee (LAC) will represent local interests in wildlife management. The membership of this forum will be left to evolve but core membership might include local communities represented by chiefs and NRC associations, DNPW, the private sector, NGOs, and other government agencies. The National Forum for Collaborative Management (NAFCOM) is a national consultative forum for wildlife management issues. Its membership must be left to evolve, but active participation so far has been from DNPW, Forestry, the private sector and conservation NGOs. In order to strengthen the Collaborative Management approach, it is intended to make both LAC and NAFCOM legal entities and statutory consultees for DNPW. The proposed framework for promoting collaborative wildlife management, including CBNRM appears as Fig.1.




Figure 2: Proposed Institutional Frame for Integrated Conservation and Development Processes in Malawi

The main features of the proposed institutional frame are:

- ♦ The formation of a National Association for Collaborative Management. The forum will bring together stakeholders in wildlife management and will be a statutory consultee. Its membership is still being defined but core members might include DNPW, the private sector, Agriculture, NGOs. Other stakeholders might be co-opted on the basis of relevant issues.
- ♦ DNPW linkages with OPC and local administration because of rural development issues. This linkage is also important because of jurisdictional questions within the border zone. DNPW must reach out to these institutions to promote linkages and co-ordination.
- ♦ The formation of Local Advisory Councils which will represent local interests in protected area management. The membership of this council is still being defined but core membership might include rural communities represented by chiefs and NRC associations, DNPW, the private sector, NGOs and Agriculture. Other stakeholders might be co-opted on the basis of relevant issues.
- ♦ The proposed formation of NRC associations on the basis of geographical proximity, common interests in the RUP, revenue sharing program, and existing social connections. Each association would be a member of the LAC to improve community representation.

INTEGRATED CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

A strategy for integrating border zone communities into protected areas planning and management has been drafted.

Its objective is to secure the primary (long-term) objectives of protected areas while contributing to the living standards of border zone communities. The strategy can diagrammatically be depicted as in Fig 3.




Fig. 2: Diagrammatic representation of ICDP Strategy (Modified after Dr. Weyl)

RECOMMENDATIONS

To contribute to achievement of the above objective, the following recommendations are made:

- ♦ The linked approach must be regarded as the cornerstone of an ICDP Strategy. However, in view of the increasingly adverse ratio of resources to people, where this strategy relies on consumptive use of protected area resources, careful monitoring and control is necessary to avoid overexploitation of the resource base.
- ♦ To the extent that they ease pressure on protected area resources, de-linked approaches appear best suited to Malawi's circumstances. However, these approaches must be linked to protected areas through various means including environmental education and extension activities, conservation based criteria for project selection, and labeling projects with DNPW logo.

- ◆ An ICDP Strategy must recognize the need and necessity for limited devolution of control over wildlife. Protected areas are state lands that are under extreme pressure owing to high population pressure and acute poverty. However, greater devolution of control over wildlife, particularly large animals, on private and customary land would create greater incentives for sustainable management.
- ◆ An ICDP Strategy needs to recognize that border zone communities face a poor incentive structure to support conservation. This situation calls for:
 - Development and implementation of systems of regulation for resource use
 - Enhancement of the value of resources through a variety of means including adding value to resources by processing and proper storage
 - Developing alternative resources outside protected areas and promoting alternative livelihoods
 - Linking wildlife focussed CBNRM initiatives with wider natural resources initiatives, particularly those based on stabilizing agriculture systems
- ◆ Agriculture and land tenure policies have a profound effect on wildlife conservation and protected area management. An ICDP Strategy must realize the need to engage in continuous dialogue with agriculture and land institutions.
- ◆ DNPW needs to deal with local level institutions as co-managers of protected areas. These institutions may be existing or newly formed ones. In all cases, the institutions require capacity building to meet technical and administrative requirements of CBNRM programs. The multiplicity of local level institutions requires that:
 - Roles, responsibilities and relationships be clearly defined
 - A coordinated approach be adopted for those sectors with similar agendas
 - The role of traditional authorities/institutions be clearly defined
- ◆ High level institutional arrangements appear to be inappropriate. Improvements should emphasize:
 - Greater participation of communities in decision-making through membership to Local Advisory Councils
 - More direct and active linkages with local government and rural administration
 - Wider stakeholder consultations through NAFCOM

- ◆ Within CM processes, the involvement in management programs of local people must be emphasized through:
 - CM agreements with DNPW
 - CBNRM initiatives
 - Border zone development initiatives
- ◆ As part of an overall Integrated Conservation and Development Strategy, trans-frontier conservation/development processes should be promoted through:
 - Establishment of a trans-frontier program and Trust
 - Joint Permanent Commissions of Cooperation
 - SADC collaboration mechanisms
 - Strengthening and building on existing community based cross-border collaboration
- ◆ The concept of Village Trusts as a mechanism of conferring legal empowerment over wildlife needs to be explored. The concept should be applied on a pilot basis in protected areas where potential for commercial use exists (tourism).
- ◆ Establish a TRUST for supporting CBNRM activities and other traditional protected area management activities.
- ◆ NGOs should be allowed to play an expanded role in the CBNRM process, for instance in the area of local institutional development process and awareness and education
- ◆ USIAD is entering the CBNRM process in Malawi through the COMPASS Project. DNPW CBNRM initiatives should link up with COMPASS to take advantage of technical and financial support under the program
- ◆ CBNRM activities represent an increased administrative and professional burden for DNPW. They also require a flexible administrative and management structure as well as a robust funding base.
 - Current efforts to enhance the funding base of the department should continue
 - Current efforts to explore a more flexible administrative and management structure should continue

- ◆ Pursue efforts to establish a Trans-frontier Tourism Conservation Area. The program will help create appropriate policy and institutional arrangements as well as the resources for implementing cross-border programs

CONCLUSION

The whole concept of CM including CBNRM is new and is in a state of flux. Department of National Parks and Wildlife is currently implementing several isolate CBNRM initiative which need to be brought together as a programme. This will facilitate exchange of ideas, information, and experiences there by removing duplicating of effort and creation of gaps. For the same reasons Department of National Parks and Wildlife needs to link up with other section involved in CBNRM programs. The forum being proposed by the COMPASS Project appears to be one such mechanism for fostering linkages.

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Annex 6

Suggested Guidelines for Standardising Incentives for Encouraging CBNRM and Ensuring Sustainable Financing Mechanisms for CBNRM Initiatives

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1. Introduction.

This paper shall not present suggested guidelines for the standardisation of incentives, but rather try to provoke some deeper understanding of the issues and the confusion around what factors require resolution.

What is CBNRM to Malawi? This most essential question has to be asked and answered so as to clearly understand the paradigm within, and therefore the associated principles to, which we challenge ourselves to work. We understand that our people are largely rural and dependent on their immediate environment to maintain and increase their standard of living, and therefore local natural resources have to be approached with a view to economically sustaining current livelihoods until new and innovative developmental opportunities prevail themselves. So sustainability becomes central. However, our Malawian context provides two conflicting premises, that of a trend of increasing population and a trend of depleting natural resources, both very challenging to slow and even more so, difficult to reverse.

'Decentralisation' is the frame or context within which current NRM and other developmental initiatives are being drawn up, and thought to this process must be given if our approach is to be validated. The incentive and financing issues are essential not only to our sector but also to all others that will work within this new context to respond to other socio-economic needs. Incentives cost, and that factor alone needs very careful attention should we wish to be in a situation that we can cope with this budget line for the foreseeable future. Should this not be thought out very carefully, not only will this new development agenda be expensive, and therefore perhaps unaffordable, but we could find ourselves breaking down before the journey even starts.

A. INCENTIVES.

We can for our own common understanding define incentives within natural resource management simply as motivational factors to attract and influence a party's involvement to assist to achieve a common agenda and set of objectives. An ideal set of incentives could include legal rights, technical support, capacity services, finance, and a market place. Others are more insidious such as money, free inputs, food for work, and can be viewed as forms of subsidy.

The Malawi situation attracts the introduction of subsidy-style incentives due to the prevalent and pervasive poverty, where the natural resource regime is generally depleted and therefore a sustainable use (ideal) equation is currently difficult to develop. Communities are seen to be poverty-stricken and the subsidies are introduced on the assumption there is no local cash flow or as development idealists are hesitant to negotiate the costs of a development agenda with the 'poor'.

However, our thoughts about 'subsidy-style' incentives run counter to the sustainability ethic that we strive to attain through the adoption of a CBNRM ethicor does it? Do we believe that we have a monopoly to enjoy certain privileges, because should it transcend to be the expense of the communities funds then conflict situations shall arise.

This situation is in contrast to other SADC states which enjoy a sound wildlife resource base, enabling the introduction of a modified management regime (CBNRM) which has brought early and meaningful benefit streams encouraging community ownership and involvement. Concurrently, such management allows for both the maintenance of a sound sustainable regenerative resource base and the development of alternative benefits. The fundamental understanding within a CBNRM paradigm is that the community here can decide to do with its income as it so chooses.

The subsidy-style incentives distortion can be traced back to the development approaches used. Do we have 'different and contradictory approaches amongst the facilitators and implementers' as a direct consequence of the variety of funding sources, with donors unprepared or unable to minimise their divergence of modalities. Should we pursue the CBNRM ethos and perhaps motivate a common approach (community-based) from the communities to request and manage support from us? And then work towards improving that ideal.

Looking at the necessary essential ingredients for ideal CBNRM, we can see that Malawi is not yet at the right position for local sustainable solutions to have success. It is these basic requirements, which if available can be referred to as true incentives to motivating community-based opportunities.

CBNRM Basics

Community Institutions
Tenure Rights
Partners
Knowledge
Finance

Current Situation


Legally Constrained / Limited Capacity
Land & Water Rights ? / Others CM Negotiable
Limited Technical Services / Few Networks
Policy & Acts Ignorance / Skills Required
Limited Grants / Credit Restricted / Income?

In the absence of some of the above basic factors, we are trying to motivate CBNRM by adding a project / programme / process approach to facilitate for capacity support where required and provide inputs support to potential activities. However, a national CBNRM process could be inspired by concurrently finalising tenure aspects appropriately and enabling the community as a legal institution. In this vacuum, we shall have to see the common use of Collaborative Management (CM) agreements which can spell out rights of use and responsibility, and the equation of benefit sharing.

Moving out from our paradigm, we can see how development approaches can be misused in the apparent objective of achieving the same agenda. Through the power-play we see a dichotomy arise between:

- **A supply oriented agenda** – Where a developmental agenda driven by external factors such as time constraints and success, utilizes a range of attractive motivational factors to maintain schedule and rectify the problem statement. And
- **A demand driven agenda** - Where a community originated or inspired process calls for minimal incentives and can be assisted towards a sustainable use / equitable benefits situation.

These different agendas play out to have specific characteristics:




Unfortunately, as stated earlier, due to the poor generative ability of natural resources to currently provide for meaningful income, food or household goods; the potential opportunity even within ideal CBNRM ventures is taken to exploit activities for allowances as a means of extracting a short-term benefit. Facilitating agencies and service providers should recognise this situation and restrain from introducing any distortions into the community circumstances within their areas of activities. Even the daily meals should be contributed to in some means from both the community and cooperating agency.

B) FINANCING MECHANISMS.


Two schematics are presented to clearly illustrate the current and potential funding flow scenarios. The first tries to show how the current situation is largely based upon unsustainable and distant sources of finance, with no recognisable cycle of funds. Here, funding into the community generates no definable outward stream aside from limited tax to central government and the resource base is 'mined' for advantage with minimal reinvestment taking place.

The second graphic attempts to describe a more ideal scenario where a range of sustainable finance channels are available to community institutions through various agreements and shared facilities, and a flow of funds can be seen to enable local development action, allow for local service delivery and inspire commercial enterprise.

Current Financing Flow



Potential Financial Flow



Annex 7

An Overview of Community-based Natural Resource Management in Africa

Andrew Watson - COMPASS

An Overview of Community-based Natural Resource Management in Africa

This background paper is based on a document prepared in 1998 as part of a summary report on the USAID-funded Conservation of Biodiverse Resource Areas (COBRA) Project in Kenya. Both the present paper and the COBRA summary were written by Andrew Watson who is currently Chief of Party of the USAID-funded COMPASS activity in Malawi.

The purpose of this document is to stimulate discussion about the potential for successful community-based management of natural resources in Malawi. It is clear from the experiences elsewhere in the broader region that the success of different programs and policies hinges on fundamental issues such as availability of resources and access to them, enabling policies and legislation and provision of technical expertise. In addition, however, there appears to be no single model for CBNRM that is universally applicable since the cultural and socio-economic conditions differ from country to country, as does the nature of the resource base. It is evident that the evolving CBNRM framework for Malawi cannot be a clone of a model from another country. This notwithstanding much can be learned from the success and failures of others since they help identify the strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches that have been tried and tested.

1 – Why attempt community-based management of natural resources?

Community-based management of wildlife populations and other natural resources such as woodlands and fisheries is nothing new in Sub-Saharan Africa. Many rural communities have practiced the sustainable use of renewable natural resources since prehistoric time. During the course of the 20th Century, however, increases in human population have placed increasing demand on these resources and, in many regions, over-exploitation has led to severe depletion and, in some cases, extirpation of certain species of wildlife. It has been estimated that about 65% of Africa's natural habitats have been lost as a result of agricultural expansion and deforestation (Kiss, 1990). While many countries have set aside significant areas of land for national parks and other conservation units, it is clear that often these are inadequately maintained. Moreover, the migratory habits of many large herbivores in Africa require geographically broader approaches to conservation. The dual threats of poaching and loss of critical habitat have threatened the ecological viability of many protected area systems in Africa.

From the economic viewpoint of rural communities, wildlife conservation has a different connotation. With the widespread banning of hunting for meat, skins, ivory and rhino horn, and severe penalties for poaching wild animals, wildlife has lost virtually all of its economic value to these people. Moreover, the creation of many protected areas represented a significant opportunity cost as the surrounding communities were also barred from harvesting wood and other products (grass for thatching, wild food, and traditional medicines). When the cost of crop damage caused by wild animals, the higher incidence of disease and depredation on stock, and the threat of attack on humans, are taken into account, many communities have regarded wild animals as a hindrance to economic development and a threat to their families.

In the 1980s it became clear to many conservation groups and international donor organizations that successful conservation strategies in Africa (and elsewhere) would require active participation of communities neighboring key protected areas. Moreover, for community participation to succeed, the groups would have to realize tangible economic benefits in order to convince them of the benefits accruing from conservation. The basic tenets of community-based natural resource management were spelled out in the International Union for the Conservation of Nature *World Conservation Strategy* (IUCN, 1980). Since then international donors and conservation groups, and many government institutions and NGOs have built up a wealth of information and knowledge about different approaches that have been tested through numerous initiatives around the world. Many case studies, tool kits, guidelines and lessons learned have been published over the past few years: see, for example, Kiss (1990); Biodiversity Support Program (1993); Brown and McGann (1996); Byers (1996); Lutz and Caldecott (1996); Borrini-Feyerabend (1997); Russell and Harshbarger (1998).

Here, we will review some of the community-based wildlife management initiatives that have been implemented over the past ten years or so in Sub-Saharan Africa. Many of these efforts are now coordinated through the Southern African Development Community's Coordinating Unit for natural resource management based in Lilongwe, Malawi. However, there has also been much of great relevance that has been accomplished beyond the 14-member SADC region – notably in Kenya. This is not presently part of the knowledge base that has been compiled for southern Africa. The purpose of this overview is to examine the main characteristics of the different community-based wildlife management programs that have been initiated in Africa. The goal is to identify broad similarities and differences in the hope that the lessons learned from specific success and failures may be extrapolated to other countries where either the approach is less advanced or where difficulties have been encountered that threaten to derail the process. The following table provides general information on the relationship of population density to protected areas and animal populations in the countries discussed here.

Parameter	Botswana	Kenya	Malawi	Namibia	South Africa	Zambia	Zimbabwe
Land area (km ²)	600,000	582,640	90,000	825,000	1,222,000	752,000	390,000
Population density	2.2	40	122	1.9	33	1.1	29
People/Cow	< 1	N/A	11	0.8	3.5	2.8	1.7
People/ Elephant	19	911	5,000	250	5,000	200	142
Protected areas km ²	225,000	44,359	20,000	110,000	72,000	219,000	50,000
People/ protected area km ²	6	534	550	14	555	36	220

The intention here is not to undertake an evaluation of the individual programs or, indeed, to assess whether the principles of community-based wildlife management are appropriate or viable for conservation of biodiversity in Sub-Saharan Africa. Evaluations of most of the programs have been completed or are in progress and the broader issues are beyond the scope of this brief review.

2 – CBNRM Programs in East and Southern Africa

Community-based natural resource management has been institutionalized in at least ten countries in Sub-Saharan Africa including Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Other countries are in the process of developing the legislative, institutional and procedural frameworks required to formalize these types of approaches. As SADC's efforts in this area increase through the support of bilateral and multilateral donors, Mozambique, Angola, Congo and others are likely to expand their current initiatives. The following figure summarizes the evolution of community-based natural resource management initiatives in the countries of the Southern African Development Community.

Here we will briefly describe the main characteristics of the largest programs.

- *Zimbabwe: Community Area Management Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE)*

The CAMPFIRE project has been widely regarded as one of the most successful models for community-based wildlife management in Africa. It is certain one of the earliest examples of institutionalization of the approach in the region. It has also attracted considerable attention internationally. This high profile has at times helped in gaining support for the program, at other times it has been a hindrance.

CAMPFIRE was officially launched in 1989 though it is founded on legislation dating from 1975 that allows private property holders to claim ownership of wildlife on their land and to benefit from its use. A precursor, the Windfall Project, differed significantly in that it provided revenues and meat from the culling of animals on state land and reserves to neighboring communities (Murindagomo, 1990). In contrast, CAMPFIRE was not intended to support the creation and maintenance buffer zones around such protected areas. Rather, its purpose was to encourage rural development through empowerment of rural communities. However, the inhabitants of rural communities, unlike private landowners, have only very weak property rights and the smaller villages and wards have only limited authority over their resources (Child, 1996). In this respect, the situation resembles that in Madagascar (GELOSE) where efforts are underway to implement legislation enabling community-based natural resource management.

Through the CAMPFIRE process a rural community's elected representative body (the Rural District Council) requests that the government's wildlife department grants them legal authority to manage local wildlife resources. In doing this, the community must demonstrate that it has the capacity to undertake this management. Rural communities have developed a wide range of projects. Most commonly, the communities sell hunting concessions to tour operators having established quotas and other rules in consultation with

the wildlife department. Other projects are based on selling photography concessions or on the villager's own use of wildlife and other natural resources. In a recent case, a community sold the timber from a eucalyptus plantation that had been managed by the village for more than 20 years.

Revenue from the CAMPFIRE projects go directly to the rural households though the rural councils have the right to impose a levy. Profits can be used to fund other communal projects. Since 1992, there has been an increasing fear that the success of CAMPFIRE will be compromised if the rural councils are not adequately financed to fulfill their expanded mandate (Child, 1996). By 1996, ten of the rural councils where at a point were about 75% of the wildlife revenues reached the producer communities.

Implementation of the CAMPFIRE program is facilitate by a collaborative group of institutions that is comprised of the CAMPFIRE Association representing the Rural District Councils (coordination), the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development (administration), the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (technical support), Zimbabwe Trust (training and capacity building), WWF (advisory support), the Africa Resources Trust (policy monitoring), the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (socioeconomic monitoring) and Action (environmental education).

- *Zambia: Administrative Management Design (ADMADE)*

Zambia's Department of National Parks and Wildlife Services (NPWS) operates the ADMADE program. An act of Parliament established ADMADE as the official instrument for promoting and enforcing wildlife conservation outside the national parks. In effect, the program is far more closely linked with an individual institution than CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe. Its purpose is to promote community-based conservation of wildlife in Zambia's 40 or so Game Management Areas (GMAs). These cover more than 100,000 km² (about 20% of the total area of the country).

The program was originally conceived in the early 1980s when the merits of two different approaches to wildlife conservation in Zambia where being publicly discussed. One approach involved the creation of a new management entity outside the prevailing government structure, the other involved modifying and strengthening existing institutions. Both approaches were adopted: the former through the Luangwa Integrated Rural Development Project (LIRDP) that operates in the South Luangwa National Park and two GMAs with funding provided by Norwegian Aid (NORAD); and the latter through ADMADE, which receives minimal donor funding mainly from USAID. ADMADE has gone through a development phase that lasted from 1989 to 1994 and a subsequent strengthening phase from 1995 to 1998.

Revenues comprise fees from hunting licenses (that are shared equally between the government and the Wildlife Conservation Revolving Fund) and concession fees paid by safari operators that are all credited to the WCRF. WCRF revenues are intended to be used for ADMADE administration (25%); field operations of Wildlife Management Units (40%); and community development (35%). In practice, regional administrative costs of the WMUs reduce the amount available for field units to about 25% of the total WCRF revenues.

ADMADE is headquartered at NPWS and extends to 12 regional commands. The headquarters unit also houses the WCRF. Since ADMADE is a program rather than an institution, most NPWS staff plays a role in its implementation. At the field level, each GMA (or each chief's area within a GMA) is under the responsibility of an ADMADE Unit comprising NPWS scouts and village scouts. Paralleling each Unit there is a Sub-Authority comprising an elected body chaired by the traditional chief made up of a Financial Management Committee, a Community Development Committee, and a Resource Management Committee. Up to 12 members of each of these committees are representatives of Village Area Groups, each of which has a committee made up of representatives of stakeholder groups or other elected members. A senior village headman, who is also an appointed member of each Sub-Authority's Community Development Committee, leads each VAG.

A key component of the ADMADE Program is the Nyamaluma Training Institute that provides training to all local players and monitors all activities.

- *Namibia: Living in a Finite Environment (LIFE) and other CBNRM initiatives*

Unlike CAMPFIRE and ADMADE that were originally conceived and launched in the 1980s, USAID's LIFE program and other CBNRM initiatives in Namibia are founded on the 1996 enactment of legislation that empowered rural communities to manage and derive benefits from their natural resources (the Nature Conservation Amendment Act). Being a new initiative, it is difficult to assess the impact of the activities that have been promoted through the enactment of the Nature Conservation Ordinance (though this dates from 1975). In November 1997, the Nyae Nyae Community Conservancy became the first to receive full government approval.

Through donor support, community members have been trained in participatory techniques and improved natural resource management strategies. Community institutions such as conservancy committees have been created, and the communities have fielded game guards and resource monitors. An immediate impact has been an apparent decline in poaching of all animal species including elephant.

Unlike in Zimbabwe and Zambia, revenues generated through the LIFE program do not come from hunting – though some consumptive use of natural resources is promoted. The draft Conservation of Biodiversity and Habitat Protection Policy (1994) and Parks and People Policy (1997) will allow communities located in protected areas to benefit from the sustainable use of wildlife. In addition to crafts production and tourism-based enterprises, USAID assisted programs in Namibia have also involved harvesting and sale of thatching grass and reeds by local communities.

Though overall successes to date have been modest, the LIFE program has attracted considerable interest in Sub-Saharan Africa through its approach to addressing gender issues and performance monitoring. The program has a rigorous M&E system that uses six tools to measure overall progress and impact. At this time CBNRM is not being implemented through a national, institutionalized program in Namibia though it does have a solid legal foundation. This contrasts sharply with CAMPFIRE, which is well established

institutionally but is not thoroughly grounded in Zimbabwean law since the authority to use wildlife resources is delegated to District Councils purely at the government's discretion (Katerere, 1997). Another marked contrast between Namibia's CBNRM efforts and those of Zimbabwe and Zambia is the degree of involvement of NGOs. At present, both CAMPFIRE and ADMADE are being implemented largely by government agencies through existing organizational structures. While NGOs are involved at various levels, their involvement in community level activities is less significant than with the LIFE program in Namibia.

- *Kenya: Conservation of Biodiverse Resources Areas (COBRA)*

The COBRA Project was initiated in 1992 as part of USAID/Kenya's support for the multi-donor PAWS Program. It has focused on building support and institutional capacity for community-based wildlife management initiatives implemented under the auspices of the Kenya Wildlife Services (KWS). In this respect, it has certain similarities with ADMADE in Zambia but Kenyan law precludes the possibility of consumptive use of wildlife. In effect, benefits are generated mainly through tourism and not from hunting.

Kenya's Wildlife (Conservation and Management) Act of 1975 and its 1989 amendment provide the legal foundation for community-based wildlife management in the country. Current discussions on revising this legislation have centered on broadening the possibility of consumptive use of wildlife – particularly through hunting. Despite the severe limitations on consumptive use, Kenya has developed an effective CBNRM program. With the support of COBRA, KWS's Partnership Department has developed a systematic process for identifying priority conservation areas lying beyond the protected area system and mobilizing local communities to develop wildlife management strategies. Communities can apply for grants from a Wildlife and Development Fund (WDF) that is capitalized using a portion of national park gate receipts as well as additional funds from USAID, the World Bank, and the Government of Kenya. This fund provides tangible benefits to those communities participating in wildlife conservation and supports efforts to develop enterprises such as tourist camps, cultural centers, and other natural resource-based business ventures. The COBRA project has been instrumental in helping several community groups and conservation associations achieve legal recognition – a step that has proven essential in developing formal agreements with business partners (see box).

Wildlife management in Kenya rests squarely on the shoulders of KWS, an organization that has enjoyed considerable donor support since it was created in 1989. Decentralization of CBNRM activities has been accomplished largely through this parastatal institution – neither local authorities nor other government organizations have been significantly involved in this process (as they have in Zimbabwe). Nor has there been a major involvement of NGOs in CBNRM activities in Kenya though conservation organizations did play an important role in promoting community-based programs in the late 1980s. Some of the most successful examples of community-based wildlife management have involved collaboration between community or conservation associations and the private sector.

- *Botswana: Natural Resources Management Program (NRMP)*

Initiated in the early 1990's, the USAID funded Botswana Natural Resource Management Project is closely affiliated with the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP).

Unlike in Zambia, however, institutionalization of Botswana's CBNRM program is still in its early days. USAID is working with the DWNP to demonstrate the feasibility of creating economic incentives to manage wildlife sustainably, by decentralizing the authority to manage natural resources, and ensuring that the economic benefits accrue to local people (Curry, 1994; Painter, 1995).

The Golini-Mwaluganje Community Elephant Sanctuary¹

The Golini-Mwaluganje area is a corridor between the Shimba Hills National Reserve (and adjacent Mkongani Forest Reserves) and the Mwaluganje Forest. On the one hand, the elephants represent a threat to biodiversity in the area through their destruction of habitat; they also destroy property and crops of the farmers living in the area. On the other hand, elephants are a major tourist attraction and the Shimba Hills reserve is close to the main coastal tourist resorts of Kenya.

The Kenya Wildlife Service was convinced that more needed to be done to address the human-elephant conflicts and also allow freer movement of elephants through the area. One of the major challenges facing further efforts was the great diversity of stakeholders: three distinct groups of landowners, several government agencies and a number of NGOs were involved. The early involvement of the COBRA Project Enterprise Development Specialist helped facilitate the process. The Eden Wildlife Trust (an NGO) took the first steps by funding the construction of a four-kilometer long electric fence to prevent elephants from entering agricultural areas. In 1993, after a series of lengthy and sometimes contentious meetings, the Golini-Mwaluganje Community Conservation Corporation was created. The stated objectives were to reduce human-elephant conflicts and generate greater benefits for community members while permitting the movement of elephants through the corridor. The constitutional sub-committee and an attorney who represented local farmers wrote a lengthy document, the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Golini-Mwaluganje Conservation Reserve. It required that landowners "give legal right of vacant possession of their parcels of land" to the Corporation and agree not to dispose of their land or use it for collateral without the consent of the Corporation.

By 1995, fifty indigenous families were members of the Corporation. The Sanctuary had been fenced, game-viewing tracks had been established and an entry gate with two ticket offices had been constructed. In 1997, the Board of Directors distributed about one million Kenyan Shillings (over \$16,000) to shareholders. Payments ranged from Ksh 60,000 to Ksh 200,000 (about \$1,000 to over \$3,000) to each family holding title to their donated land. In addition, an investor has agreed to build a lodge in the Sanctuary and has agreed to a concession payment of Ksh 50,000 (about \$800) per month. The plans call for employing up to about 50 local people.

Problems still remain. Since profit sharing is based on the amount of land contributed to the Sanctuary, it is critical that ownership is clear; however, the adjudication and titling process has been extremely slow in some areas. Sanctuary management has also posed problems with the selection of a manager being handled by the Board of Directors rather than all members of the Corporation. In addition, the recent disastrous decline in tourism to Kenya is likely to have a detrimental effect on gate receipts. Nevertheless, the Sanctuary provides a valuable lesson in what is needed to create such enterprises: broad participation, transparent decision-making, equitable distribution of benefits, and the forging of partnerships with NGOs and the private sector.

¹ From Cocheba, D.J. & Ndirangu, J. (1998). The Golini-Mwaluganja Community Elephant Sanctuary: a community conservation poised for success but plagued by an elephant management dilemma. Unpublished paper.

The importance of livestock in the economy of Botswana has given rise to increasing conflict between ranchers and conservationists as the desire to fence rangeland has increased. It is estimated that the construction of the Kuke fence resulted in the death of about 80,000 wildebeest in 1964 and another 50,000 in 1983 when the animals' migration routes to food and water were cut off (SARDC, 1994). To date, wildlife management in Botswana has focused largely on consumptive use of resources mainly through hunting. In addition to other off-take quotas, Special Game Licenses (SGLs) for subsistence hunting are issued to people living in remote areas. In 1995 there were about 800 to 1000 active licenses. The resulting off-take has not been tracked and there is poor monitoring of the impact on biological sustainability of hunting. Overall, there has been sharp decline in the numbers of most wildlife species. The DWNP is mandated to promote commercialization of the wildlife utilization sector but a host of related issues must also be addressed. These include: establishing hunting quotas; community access to natural resources in Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) and national parks; land use planning for conservation, ranching and agriculture; problem animal control and conflict resolution; and the role of CBNRM in income generation for rural communities (Lawson and Mafela, 1990). Recent efforts have focussed on a broader approach to managing natural resources that includes harvesting of grass and wild fruit, forestry, fishing and tourism. In 1994, for example, three villages created a community-based organization (CBO) that in 1996 harvested 50 tonnes of wild marula fruit (*Sclerocarya birrea*) that is used for making fruit juices and a variety of other products.

NRMP has assisted in the creation of CBOs and trusts and a fund has been created to help support the development of constitutions and to provide training and enterprise development grants. The Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust was created in 1993 and represents five villages. All adults in each village are eligible to vote to elect a 10-member Village Trust Committee that then selects two members to sit on the Trust's board. The model is not dissimilar to that being promoted through ADMADE though in Zambia the links to the traditional village hierarchy are markedly stronger.

- *Madagascar (GELOSE), Malawi (COMPASS) and Tanzania,*

Several other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have experimented with CBNRM and others have developed policies and legislation that will enable rural communities to take charge of the management and use of their natural resources.

In Madagascar, legislation has been prepared that will enable communities to enter into agreements with government to implement management plans (GELOSE – Gestion Locale Sécurisé). Communities and associations will be able to obtain financial and technical support through programs that have been established as part of the second five-year phase of the country's Environmental Action Plan. Several community forestry projects have been launched in Madagascar through initiatives funded by bilateral donor organizations and supported by conservation NGOs. USAID has designed a program that will provide technical and financial support for the creation of conservation-based enterprises in four different ecological regions of the island.

In Malawi, USAID has designed a CBNRM program called COMPASS (Community Partnerships for Sustainable Resource Management) that will support both community-

based initiatives and strengthening of NGOs. The policy framework for such programs is still evolving in Malawi and changes in land and natural resource tenure still require clarification. While Malawi's natural resource base differs markedly from that of neighboring countries (see table), future approaches to CBNRM will undoubtedly draw heavily from experiences throughout the region.

Tanzania started experimenting with CBNRM in the late 1980s when the African Wildlife Foundation (an international conservation NGO) collaborated with Tanzania National Parks to help establish a community conservation service. A pilot project in the Loliondo Game Controlled Area adjacent to the Serengeti National Park explored the possibilities presented by different revenue generating opportunities based on hunting as well as tourism. Other CBNRM initiatives have followed including the Selous Conservation Program that is estimated to reach over 80,000 local people. People living near hunting areas in Tanzania receive a percentage of the license fees. Nevertheless, though the legal framework that will allow communities to take full responsibility for management of the resources has been elaborated, implementation has lagged (SARDC, 1994).

3 – What are the similarities and differences?

- *Legal framework*

The legal underpinnings for CBNRM differ greatly in the various countries described above. In Kenya, for example, consumptive use of wildlife is rarely allowed and only with the special permission of KWS. In Zambia and Botswana, the authorities responsible for wildlife management grant hunting licenses. In Zimbabwe, the central authority must approve community-based wildlife management plans. In Namibia, tenure over natural resources is being devolved to local communities through the creation community conservancies that have considerable rights to manage wildlife. In many countries in southern Africa, tenure over natural resources is closely tied to systems of land tenure. In many countries in the region, village land is either communally owned or state-owned and, hence, the authority to use natural resources rests with national, local or traditional authorities. In many cases, this has constrained efforts to develop community-based approaches to resource management.

CAMPFIRE has demonstrated that grass-roots initiatives can be implemented successfully without full legislative support. In Zimbabwe, the authority to use natural resources can be devolved only to the rural councils and not to the local communities (Child, 1996; Katerere, 1997). Moreover, the groundswell of support has encouraged the revision of national policies and laws. Child (1996: p. 133) noted that:

The key to this model is proprietary self-interest, with ownership being exerted at the community level, represented by the village development committee. For this to work, however, agrarian laws must be changed toward private community resource ownership, and to achieve this a political process is unavoidable.

- *Resource base and socio-economics*

While some tribal groups in southern Africa are traditionally dependent on wildlife (notably in parts of Namibia and Botswana), in most countries the hunting of wild animals is restricted. Under such conditions, wildlife represents a cost rather than a benefit to rural communities. This contrasts sharply with the reliance on other natural resources notably agricultural land, water, wood for fuel, and other plant materials for building, food and medicines. In effect, wildlife is regarded in a different light than other natural resources and strategies for its management must take this into consideration. Sustainable use of a natural resource often relies on providing economically viable alternatives to a resource that is being unsustainably exploited. The depletion of a resource that is perceived to be a free good by rural populations cannot be prevented if behavioral change comes with an added cost to the resource users. Communities must derive tangible benefits from changes in their practices if these changes are to be sustained. If greater benefits can be derived from activities that conserve natural resources than from those practices that deplete the same resources, individuals will be inclined to move away from the destructive practices. Similarly, if living in close proximity to wildlife incurs a cost to rural communities it must be offset in some way by providing an economic or social benefit. Such benefits may be in the form of direct monetary compensation (for example, sharing a percentage of park entrance fees with those neighboring communities that incur an opportunity cost through loss of access to natural resources). Alternatively, support can be provided for natural resource based enterprise development that can be based on either consumptive or non-consumptive use of the resources.

- *What generates revenues and income?*

Sustainable ecotourism and nature tourism are the most widely practiced types of non-consumptive natural resource use. In Kenya, community associations have been moderately successful in establishing business agreements with tour operators and entrepreneurs who pay the associations for the right to have access to community conservation areas and camps. Communities in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Namibia and Botswana have made similar arrangements. Despite providing alternative sources of income from various types of employment, ecotourism in Africa has rarely generated significant benefits for rural communities. Even in Kenya, which has traditionally been a preferred destination for European and North American ecotourists, many enterprises have realized only limited success.

In Zimbabwe, over 90% of all CAMPFIRE revenues in 1993 were from sport hunting fees the remainder coming from tourism and ancillary activities. Two-thirds of the revenues from hunting came from elephant trophies with another quarter from buffalo, leopard and sable antelope. By 1996, about 35 tonnes of elephant ivory, worth about US\$5 million, was stored in Zimbabwe as a result of the 1989 ban on international trade (Child, 1996). The high reliance on elephant hunting to generate income for the program has attracted considerable debate not least because of the African elephant's status as an endangered species. The animal was listed in Appendix A of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) until 1998 when the elephant's status was relaxed in Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia.

In Zambia, most of the revenues generated by the ADMADE program come from hunting of lion and leopard. Again, this has attracted criticism on ecological as well as ethical grounds. In order to assess the ecological impact of these programs, a rigorous monitoring system is essential. In Zimbabwe, about 22 % of CAMPFIRE revenues are reinvested in wildlife management and in Zambia about 40% of ADMADE revenues go toward meeting the operational costs of Wildlife Management Units (though over one-third of this is allocated to regional commands rather than field operations).

The ethical issues raised by the reliance on hunting of wildlife to fund these community-based natural resource management programs have prompted rancorous debate. USAID's support for CAMPFIRE and to a lesser extent ADMADE has sparked public criticism from the Humane Society and other organizations. Though opinions on the ethics and morality of the hunting of wildlife should not be discounted, they are often far removed from the realities of wildlife management, community development and conservation in East and Southern Africa. Relaxation of the CITES regulations governing the African elephant reflect a fundamental change in the attitudes of many conservation groups and governments in southern Africa. It was only in the early 1990's that many of these same groups were instrumental in imposing the worldwide ban on the trade in ivory. The potential for allowing greater consumptive use of wildlife is currently under discussion in Kenya, which currently has the most restrictive regulations of the countries considered here. Similarly, with the recent changes in CITES, the pressure to expand wildlife management programs in Botswana and Namibia to include more community-sanctioned sport hunting will undoubtedly increase.

- *Who is providing support?*

Ostensibly the community-based wildlife programs of East and Southern Africa are intended to be financially self-sufficient, generating revenues for administration and wildlife management as well as for community development. In some cases, notably in Zambia, the potential for achieving such sustainability appears to be good. In contrast, in Kenya, the heavy reliance on tourism to generate revenues has resulted in severe financial woes in recent years as park gate receipts have fallen up to 70%. The international donor community has provided significant financial support in Kenya - the PAWS program receiving over \$140 million up to 1998. USAID has been a key donor and provider of technical assistance to the wildlife management programs in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, Botswana and, most recently, in Malawi. Without this and the support of other bilateral donors and many conservation groups it is unlikely that most of these programs could be sustained.

- *Governance and tenure systems*

The extent to which communities have the legal authority to use the natural resources on their communal lands differs greatly from country to country in the region. In Kenya, wildlife management is the responsibility of the state through the Kenya Wildlife Service. In contrast, individual and community tenure over land is strong. The situation in other countries is often the reverse. Namibia's new laws on natural resource tenure provide some of the strongest legislative mechanisms for empowering local communities to take charge of the management of their resource base. However, several tribal groups in the

country do not have any traditional systems of land tenure since they do not comprise sedentary communities. Elsewhere, state ownership of conservation land and areas where natural resource use is controlled presents a challenge for developing systems of co-management that are beneficial to both the state and local stakeholders. In Malawi, changes in legislation are currently being considered that may allow communities greater access to state-managed woodlands but, in return, the state may require a greater say in how communities manage the resources on their own land.

Systems of governance also differ widely from country to country and, indeed, from regional to region and among tribal groups. As a result, adherence to traditional land use practices and authorities can vary markedly. In Zambia, the success of the ADMADE program in some areas has been attributed to the support provided by traditional leaders. This has also attracted criticism since revenues accruing to communities have sometimes been used to construct palaces for local chiefs. Though this has been cited as evidence of the inequitable use of revenues, similar to the use of the WDF in Kenya to fund "good-will projects", such investments do often build confidence and support. Experience throughout the region has shown that there is no set formula for designing the administrative structure of community-based resource management programs. If traditional leadership is strong, it must be included in the organizational structure. If it is weak, mechanisms must be created that compensate for this through a process that is consensual. Western concepts of democracy and governance are not necessarily the best approach: in parts of Madagascar traditional systems of tenure hold sway over national laws, and in Zambia attempts to bypass the involvement of traditional leaders in ADMADE has proven problematic.

- *What's working and what's not?*

If donor funding is not available to support the bureaucratic infrastructure (or if revenues fall) is there a danger that natural resources will be overexploited to compensate?

The goals of the various community based wildlife and natural resource management projects that are currently operational in southern Africa are often very different. While all the programs are intended to help conserve natural resources through improved stewardship by rural communities and other stakeholders, some have also been charged with covering associated support costs. In Zambia, for example, the ADMADE is expected to contribute to financing of game rangers and regional administration of the program. This contrasts sharply with CBNRM initiatives in Kenya, which are funded primarily by international donors and the central government. Here, only about one-third of funding available to the Wildlife and Development Facility that supports community programs came from revenues generated from wildlife management (in this case gate receipts from parks). In Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia many of the costs associated with the administration and management of the community-based programs are borne by donors and central government. In the case of CAMPFIRE, the goal has been to retain just 20% of revenues for management (15%) and administration (5%). In reality, between 1989 and 1993, the rural district councils have been obliged to retain more of the revenues for reinvestment in wildlife management.

There will always be competing demands for funds for supporting community initiatives, for administration, and for improved wildlife management to ensure that the programs are

ecologically sustainable. In the case of both CAMPFIRE and ADMADE, revenues have been channeled to meet these needs and the potential for financial sustainability exists. In the case of ADMADE, this potential has been demonstrated on a local scale but many wildlife management areas have been all but neglected. In Zambia, and to a lesser extent Zimbabwe, there remains a pressing need for information on the ecological sustainability of the initiatives. In Kenya, Botswana and Namibia, where there is less potential for revenue generation directly from wildlife, financial sustainability is less certain. Though there are concerns about the environmental sustainability of wildlife management programs in each of these countries, they relate more to competition for land than to exploitation of wildlife.

- *Who is benefiting?*

The fundamental goal of most of the community-based natural resource management programs in that USAID has supported in East and Southern Africa is to demonstrate that it is possible to create economic incentives for the conservation of resources and management of wildlife. In order to accomplish this, it is acknowledged that local people must have the authority to make decisions regarding the use of the resources and they must realize the benefits. Many of the programs described here have demonstrated that the distribution of benefits is infrequently equitable. Often the people, whose access to resources is reduced as a result of stricter management and those who are charged with direct management of the resources (often one and the same), are not the principal beneficiaries. In Kenya, Zambia and Botswana, revenues from tourism and hunting licenses help support the government departments responsible for wildlife and protected area management. In several counties, regional or local authorities impose a levy that covers the cost incurred administering the programs. In all cases, the distribution of revenues at the local and community level is in the hands of traditional leaders or committees that appear rarely to represent the interests of those stakeholders that are ultimately responsible for management of the natural resources. Hence, in Namibia and Botswana, groups that are traditionally reliant on hunting are not well integrated into the LIFE and NRMP programs. Notably in Kenya but elsewhere too, the participation of women in decision making on the use of resources and distribution of benefits is all but insignificant.

Ultimately, the resolution of these shortcomings will require major changes in local governance and many fundamental societal attitudes. Such changes will not come quickly or easily, so it is incumbent on those that support efforts at improving the management of natural resources to work within the constraints of existing policies, legislation and practices while striving to encourage their reevaluation and revision.

Painter (1995) and Child (1996) stressed that successful CBNRM requires enabling local populations to take informed decisions in managing wildlife and other resources through a full and active exchange of information at the local level. In order to achieve this, community institutions must represent all stakeholders and procedures for fair resolution of conflicts must be in place. In addition, it is essential that national policies and legislation support such devolution of resource tenure and governance that provides the authority to make decisions on resource use at the local level. All this must be supported by extension services that provide the knowledge and skills to manage resources sustainably to communities where literacy levels are low.

- *Monitoring and Evaluation*

Monitoring of the performance and impact of CBNRM program is essential in order to assess what is working and what is not. While an activity is being implemented, it is important to track whether performance targets are being met. At a broader level, however, it is critical to evaluate periodically whether the fundamental precepts of the program are being borne out. In other words, is the approach that is being implemented generating the social and economic benefits that were anticipated and, even more importantly, is the impact on the natural resource base both positive and sustainable.

Monitoring systems are management tools. All too often the social and environmental monitoring systems that have been implemented for CBNRM programs have been poorly constructed since they do not address the fundamental issues of performance and impact. Many are reliant on costly, time consuming data collection and have little regard for the needs of the end-users, which are typically program managers and local practitioners. Data collection must not become an end in itself. The data must be collected economically, analyzed promptly, and the results disseminated widely in a form that is readily understood by the target audience. Community-based monitoring can provide a means to achieving these objectives. If community groups are involved in the identification of both indicators and performance targets, their willingness to contribute information and participate in data collection is more likely. It is essential, however, that the results of the monitoring are reported back to these same stakeholders in a way that is readily understandable and useful to them.

Community-based monitoring can be effective for collecting both socioeconomic data and ecological information. It is important that all the communities within a single program area use the same or very similar indicators in order to facilitate comparison (Goodman, 1996). In addition, the quality of the data must be periodically assessed by independent means. In Kenya, the COBRA project has supported aerial game counts that provide an essential regional baseline against which regular, local counts can be compared. It is also essential that the analysis and interpretation of monitoring information draws on local expertise and knowledge. In Zambia, for example, the number of snares found in different districts has been used as an indicator of the prevalence of poaching. When the numbers increased significantly in one area, it was assumed that the ADMADE program there was failing. In reality, there were more snares because poachers were obtaining wire from recently installed telephone lines (USAID, 1998).

4 - Towards a CBNRM paradigm

The protracted search for a southern African CBNRM paradigm highlights one of the greatest constraints to achieving sustainable natural resource management) inappropriate legal and institutional arrangements. At one extreme, some insist that governments should devolve responsibility for NRM to rural communities and traditional structures that have a better understanding of local conditions. Others argue that devolution is not the panacea to current environmental, economic and social problems (Katerere, 1997).

Undoubtedly, national policies and legislation must be conducive to encouraging and enabling local resource users to manage those resources sustainably. In addition, however,

the knowledge and skills to implement durable CBNRM activities must be available along with the ability of local institutions to resolve conflicts and administer access to resources and distribution of benefits. Most importantly, however, the incentives for sustainable resource management must be tangible and the benefits must be realized equitable with those that bear the highest cost also reaping the greatest rewards.

To date, in East and Southern Africa and elsewhere, CBNRM initiatives have focused on alleviating policy constraints, building institutional capacity, establishing baseline socioeconomic and ecological conditions, and promoting community enterprises that help generate revenue through the sustainable use of natural resources. We are now at a point where it is clear that the further progress is largely constrained by limited capacity to create benefits that tangibly offset the lost opportunities and other costs implicit in limiting free access to resources (see, for example, Barrett and Arcese, 1995).

Russell and Harshbarger (1998) argued that future support for conservation-based enterprise development must focus on providing wider access to credit and savings opportunities, to markets, and to market information. Without these, businesses cannot succeed and their failure will be seen as an indictment of CBNRM efforts. The lessons learned through the COBRA project over the past six years demonstrate that government agencies and conservation groups can help mobilize local communities but they are poor providers of business expertise. These skills must come from private sector entrepreneurs who are willing to provide their expertise and other services in exchange for commercial considerations such as business franchises or easements that provide access to community lands or other resources.

5 - What do the African models look like? Where do they fit in the paradigm?

Several of the CBNRM programs that USAID has supported in Africa have promoted partnerships between the private sector and community enterprises. The ADMADE and CAMPFIRE programs rely heavily on forging commercial agreements between tour and safari operators and local communities. In Kenya, where conservation-based enterprises are largely reliant on tourism, linkages with European tour companies has proven lucrative for several community enterprises despite the catastrophic decline in tourism in the country over the past two years. Similarly, NRMP in Botswana has supported tourist development efforts in a few areas - notably Chobe. In all these countries, however, the benefits from such undertakings have been limited to relatively few communities or districts. Elsewhere, viable commercial enterprises are rare. The creation of cultural centers and curio ventures are often of a small-scale and rarely generate significant income. When business management skills are lacking, the distribution of profits can be contentious and the reinvestment of income to promote growth is often a low priority. This notwithstanding, the LIFE program in Namibia has helped community cooperatives establish such enterprises and they are generating both profits and broader interest in neighboring communities.

The revenues that are provided by small-scale community-based enterprises need not be great to generate interest and encourage similar ventures. Nevertheless, they must provide tangible benefits that more than compensate for the direct and opportunity costs. If women are involved in making curios or staffing a stand, another member of the household must be

available to undertake other duties such as collecting water and fuel wood, cooking, gardening, and so on.

Even more importantly from an environmental standpoint, the commercial enterprises must be demonstrably linked to improved resource management. The manufacture and sale of crafts should be environmentally sustainable in themselves (not based on exploitation of rare tree species, for example) but must also rely on a robust tourist industry that is based on wildlife conservation and environmental protection.

6 – What’s needed and what works?

Murphree (1993) listed five optimal conditions under which community-based management of natural resources is likely to be successful. They are as follows:

- 1 - the resource(s) must have a measurable value to the community;
- 2 - differential contributions must result in differential benefits;
- 3 - higher quality management of the resource must be rewarded with greater benefits;
- 4 - the unit within the community or group that makes decisions on resource use must undertake the management activities and reap the rewards; and
- 5 - the unit of proprietorship should be as small as possible.

Based on the experiences to date in East and Southern Africa, the opportunities for successful implementation of CBNRM initiatives are limited to those countries and communities where the following policy and governance conditions are met:

- 1 - there is legal authority for the community to make decisions on how to use the resources;
- 2 - there is local authority to decide who can use the resources; and
- 3 - there are mechanisms in place to ensure equitable distribution of benefits and resolve any conflicts that arise.

In addition, however, there are other prerequisites including that

- 1 - natural resources are available for sustainable use (other than subsistence);
- 2 - markets exist or can be developed for those resources; and
- 3 - information is available on how to manage the resources to ensure that economic incentives and ecological benefits are sustained.

Though there will always be a need to reassess and revise natural resource policies as social, economic and environmental conditions change, perhaps the greatest shortcoming in

current approaches to CBNRM is the need for developing durable, market-based incentives for conservation of resources by rural communities. It merits noting that in the case of the successful community-based forestry program in the Philippines, participants (and non-participants) identified the main objectives of the program as:

- ◆ To provide alternative sources of income; and
- ◆ To market members' farm products.

The objective of implementing reforestation and planting trees came only third. Moreover, it is worth noting that the objectives of helping the community and improving the environment were ranked ninth and tenth respectively in terms of importance (DAI, 1997).

7 - What does the future hold?

Future directions in community-based management of natural resources must focus on greater private sector involvement in the design and implementation of conservation-based enterprises. The private sector can provide the business management skills and marketing knowledge required to develop viable commercial enterprises. These skills cannot be supplied by government agencies or by most NGOs. In return, community groups will have to negotiate agreements with businesses in order to compensate them for providing knowledge and services. Experience in Kenya has shown that community groups must have access to legal services if they are to negotiate binding agreements that spread the business risks evenly and distribute potential benefits in an equitable fashion.

On a broader scale, the current trend toward supporting community involvement in natural resource management must be encouraged. Undoubtedly, there are instances where conservation of natural resources is neither feasible nor practical owing to the social or economic climate. Just as individual conservation enterprises may succeed or fail, so too will CBNRM programs in different parts of the world. CBNRM will not provide the solution to environmental degradation and resource depletion in developing countries. Nevertheless, experience to date in Africa and elsewhere has demonstrated that policies that support CBNRM and local initiatives that encourage it, can provide powerful incentives for the conservation of natural resources. In the medium to long-term this will make these developing economies more robust.

One of the biggest threats to the future success of CBNRM in Africa is opposition to the commercialized hunting of wild animals. Such opposition comes largely from conservation groups in North America and Europe. In the late 1980s and early 1990s the focus of these groups was largely on a perceived threat to endangered species. This resulted in the international ban on the trade in elephant ivory. In 1998, the relaxation of the status of the African elephant (in Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia) within the terms of the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), represented a swing in opinion away from strict non-consumptive use of wildlife. Yet, in the United States the lobbying of the Congress and pressure being exerted on USAID to discontinue support for programs such as CAMPFIRE (and others) threatens to undermine the progress that has been made in CBNRM. In Kenya and elsewhere it has been demonstrated that unless local communities realize tangible benefits from conserving wildlife, they are unwilling to accept the responsibilities of being its stewards. The Kenyan experience also shows that viable

wildlife populations cannot be confined to discrete protected areas that can be fenced and patrolled. In Africa, wildlife populations are highly dynamic and their mobility must be assured if they are to remain ecologically viable. To accomplish this, the international community (including donors and NGOs) must work with national governments to implement policies and strengthen institutions that encourage and support local participation in wildlife management.

As a result of COBRA, CAMPFIRE and other community-based wildlife management programs, the perceptions of rural communities toward wildlife are changing. Increasingly, the cost of living in close proximity to wildlife is being supplanted by an appreciation of the economic values and environmental benefits. Through the empowerment of local communities to derive benefits from the sustainable use of these resources, the communities themselves have developed a greater sense of independence and are encouraged to build a collective vision for the future.

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Annex 8

Institutional Arrangements for Improved Management of Natural Resources by Local Communities in Malawi

Workshop recommendations on modalities for Community-based Natural Resources Management in Malawi¹⁶

¹⁶ The workshop recommendations were presented to the National Council on the Environment in December 1999 and subsequently revised by the CBNRM Task Force in late December to integrate the comments of the members of the NCE. This annex represents the revised recommendations that were presented to the NCE in March 2000 and accepted.

RECOMMENDATIONS ON MODALITIES FOR COMMUNITY BASED NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN MALAWI

1. Background

Since the development of the National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) in 1994, there has been an emergence of many organisations in the environment and natural resources sector. These organisations, through the use of community based programme/projects have put tremendous effort into addressing environmental issues outlined in the NEAP. The concept of Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) has attracted the support of Government agencies, NGOs, Donors, Community Based Organizations and the private sector. Whether the natural resources are forests, wildlife, fisheries or soil and water, an ever-increasing body of evidence suggests that sustainable use is most likely to be achieved when local communities are involved in developing and implementing management plans.

However, implementation of field programs has not been systematically coordinated. As a result, there have been complaints to the Environmental Affairs Department (EAD) on the conflicting methodologies and operational modalities for CBNRM in various parts of the country. This has led to mounting frustration on the part of local project managers, leaders and potential beneficiaries of CBNRM. It is widely recognised that for CBNRM to be implemented expeditiously and effectively in Malawi, two immediate requirements must be met first: coordination in the implementation of CBNRM programmes/projects must be improved; and guidelines for CBNRM have to be developed.

EAD, being the national coordinator of all environmental activities in the country, initiated a process that was intended to lead to the development of a coordination mechanism and guiding principles for CBNRM activities in Malawi. With the approval of the NCE, meetings of all stake-holders were held and this resulted into a national consultative workshop for operational modalities of CBNRM. The workshop was attended by project managers involved in CBNRM activities, Government agencies and NGOs. The main objectives of the workshop were:

- (a) to develop guiding principles for CBNRM activities in Malawi
- (b) to develop a coordination mechanism for the implementation of CBNRM activities
- (c) to develop guidelines for provision of incentives in CBNRM activities.

The workshop came up with the following three recommendations which are being tabled to the NCE for approval and direction.

A. Guiding Principles for CBNRM Activities in Matawi

1. In CBNRM, communities should be the prime beneficiaries
2. Communities should take the leading role in identifying, planning and implementing CBNRM activities, and the roles and responsibilities of other participating stakeholders should be clearly defined
3. At the local level, CBNRM activities should be managed by democratically elected institutions or committees linked to Local Authority structure
4. Communities must develop clearly defined constitutions for their institutions or committees and establish by-laws for natural resources management
5. The competent authority must clearly defined user groups and resource boundaries of the natural resources being managed.
6. To ensure sustainability, natural resources should be treated as economic goods hence short and long-term benefits directly related to use of the resources should be tangible and obvious to the communities
7. Arrangements for lease and ownership of resources and the right to use them should be clear
8. CBNRM activities must be gender sensitive or gender neutral
9. CBNRM programs must promote equitable sharing of benefits and distribution of costs
10. CBNRM service providers should be supportive of other community priorities and needs

It was suggested that these guidelines, if approved by the Council, would have to be binding either as an amendment to the Environmental Management Act or standing on their own.

B. Incentives for Encouraging CBNRM

An incentive is defined as: *something provided to or derived by an individual or group to encourage, in this case, better management of natural resources.*

1. Programs that are demand driven and needs based automatically generate incentives
2. Facilitating access to resources providing short term benefits also acts as an incentive for adoption of longer term natural resources management activities

- 3 Involvement of communities in programs/projects from the initial stages encourages belief in ownership and the need for incentives is reduced.
- 4 The principle of community members receiving incentives for services is accepted but funds for this must be generated by the community through benefits accruing from the services provided
- 5 There is need for standardisation of incentives provided to service providers
- 6 Incentives can be provided to service providers but these should be performance-based and result oriented.

C. Institutional Arrangements for Improved Coordination in the Implementation of CBNRM Activities in Malawi

C1. In view of the involvement of diverse organisations and interest groups in CBNRM issues in Malawi, it is essential to have broad participation in dialog policy matters and implementation issues. The fundamental importance of sustainable natural resources management in Malawi and its necessity for the wellbeing of most Malawians warrants creation of a structure that will harmonize the basic planning and implementation procedures for CBNRM activities in Malawi. In this regard, the workshop participants recommended the formation of a Working Group for CBNRM activities in Malawi that would be closely affiliated with an existing institution. Therefore, the workshop recommended that the Working Group (WG) should be under the NCE thereby facilitating decision making at policy level.

C2 Composition and Structure of WG: The WG should be made up of a manageable number of members representing as broad a range of interested parties as possible.

C2.1 It is suggested that the WG be made up of eight members of the NCE with the other four co-opted to make up twelve. The following institutions were proposed to be representatives of the WG:

1. Secretary for Agriculture and Irrigation
 2. Secretary for Natural Resources and Environmental Affairs
 3. Secretary for Water Development
 4. Secretary for Education
 5. Secretary for Local Government
 6. Secretary for Gender, Youth and Community Services
 7. Secretary for National Research Council
 8. Secretary for Health and Population
 9. One traditional Leader
 10. Director of CURE
 11. Director of Centre for Social Research
 12. Head of Malawi Environmental Endowment Trust
- Department of Environmental Affairs shall be the Secretariat of the WG

C3. Role and Responsibilities of WG: The mandate of the WG should focus on the Coordination of policy issues and the implementation of CBNRM activities in the country as stipulated in the terms of reference below.

C4. Functional Arrangements; meetings of WG should be synchronized with the quarterly meeting of the NCE to which it reports.

C5. Secretariat: It was suggested that Department of Environmental Affairs be the logical home for the Secretariat. The possibility of combining functions of the Secretariat with those of EDOs and focal points has a lot of merit. By having this unit fulfill a dual role, linkages between EDOs and the NCE through the WG are significantly strengthened.

C6. How can financing be assured ? The cost associated with organizing quarterly and other meetings and undertaking functions stipulated in the TORs including operations of the Secretariat cannot be ignored. The failure of several WGs in the recent past has been attributed to lack of financial resources. It is anticipated that donor funding will be essential at the outset and it is hoped that donors currently funding CBNRM activities will be willing to contribute to the smooth operation of the WG and Secretariat. It was felt that in the longer term, Government commitment is essential and that funding should be through the national budget.

C7. Terms of Reference for the WG: The following are the proposed TORs for the WG:

1. The WG shall coordinate the formulation and implementation of policies and programs/projects relating to CBNRM in the country.

2. It shall commission investigations and studies into the social and economic aspects of CBNRM as may be required by the Council.

3. Specifically, the WG shall coordinate CBNRM activities by undertaking the following:

- a) develop tools and mechanisms to ensure that CBNRM guidelines are adhered to by all stakeholders.

- b) ensure the formulation of procedures for improved coordination of CBNRM activities in the country and ensure their implementation

- c) facilitate the annual assessment of CBNRM activities in Malawi

- d) commission the development of a monitoring system for the CBNRM process in the country

- e) ensure the development of elaborate procedures for ensuring representation of local communities in the CBNRM process

- f) facilitate the development of guidelines to ensure that the costs and benefits of sustainable management of natural resources are distributed equitably.
- g) give guidance on the development and review of sectoral policies that impinge upon CBNRM activities in the country
- h) commission the development of a strategic plan for implementing CBNRM in Malawi